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Letter from the Department of Political Science
The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is
proud to present Volume 2 of The Ramerican Political Science Review. This
journal presents some of the best undergraduate work produced by
students at VCU during the 2016‐2017 academic year.
Political science students ask normatively important questions impacting
politics at home and abroad, and the six papers featured in this volume are
examples of the extensive research and the systematic investigations
conducted in order to begin answering those questions.
Domestically, U.S. politics are becoming increasingly contentious. College
campuses and public spaces are the battlefields on which the new culture
wars are being fought, and Margaret Hemenway and Mariah Hines explore
the way the politics of identity plays out within these contexts by testing
diversity’s impact on tolerance and social identity’s impact on political
mobilization, respectively.
Internationally, the political and economic landscape is constantly shifting,
with nations repositioning themselves and their allyships in order to meet
the demands of an increasingly globalized and weaponized world. David
Hayter explores one of these shifting partnerships by exploring the
relationship between Russia and China; Hayter investigates how those
nations have used existing institutional frameworks to advance their
relationship, and asks how such partnerships might impact other nations if
the balance of economic and political power shifts toward multipolarity.
The questions political science students ask encompass a range of sub‐
fields and use a variety of theoretical approaches and political science
methods. Trevor Davis offers an in‐depth case study of Somaliland to
better develop theories concerning international legal responses to
secessionist movements. Matthew Helton uses a survey experiment to
explore whether media frames that contribute to a narrative of social
deviance around the queer community negatively impact feelings toward
the queer community in general and support for that community via policy
initiatives such as access to PrEP. These papers demonstrate the utility of
both qualitative and quantitative research methods as applied to the study
of political science.
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Additionally, political science research informs its readers of what lessons
we should be learning from the past and how we might apply those lessons
to an uncertain future. Savannah‐Zhané Jolley explores historical
underpinnings of the Rwandan genocide, as well as the muted international
response to the death and devastation, in order to better understand the
warning signs when presented with future genocidal crises.
We hope that these articles not only help to provide better understanding
of relevant questions concerning the state of our politics, domestically and
abroad, but also that they help inspire new questions for our readers.
Furthermore, we hope that the work of this volume’s researchers will
encourage other students to conduct their own political science research,
and to submit it for consideration to The Ramerican Political Science Review
next year, whether exploring American politics, international relations,
comparative politics, public policy or political theory.
While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science and
the contributions of our alumni, the final product is the work of a student
editorial board that solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double‐blind
fashion. Over forty submissions were received and reviewed by the
editors. The researchers featured in this issue went through a “revise and
resubmit” process, wherein they made content and style changes that
were requested by the editorial staff. The articles were then edited once
more by the editorial staff prior to publication. This final product is a
testament to their immense efforts during the summer months. The
Department of Political Science would, therefore, like to thank this year’s
editorial board:
David Abbey, Class of 2015
Saffeya Ahmed, Class of 2019
Moige Nyamweya, Class of 2018
Mikaela Turkan Reinard, Class of 2018
The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra
Reckendorf for advising our student editorial board as they worked through
the process of critiquing submissions and formatting this journal.
VCU Department of Political Science
August 2017
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Diversity and Tolerance: The Intergroup Contact Theory in Practice
Margaret Hemenway, Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
There are a variety of theories regarding how an individual’s social and
political tolerance is affected when in a diverse environment and
surrounded by members of different racial, ethnic, and religious groups.
This study seeks to examine these concepts in the context of university
campuses. This paper suggests that increased exposure to groups different
from one’s own corresponds to an increased tolerance level toward those
groups. This conclusion is due, in part, to the fact that universities provide
more of a collaborative environment rather than a competitive one. Using
a survey, students at multiple Eastern universities are polled to determine
the perceived diversity of their school and their environment, as well as
their levels of social and political tolerance towards groups different than
their own.
Introduction
The student body of Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) is 50.6%
white, 18.8% African American, 13.3% Asian, and 8.7% Hispanic, as well as
5.7% being of two or more races (“Virginia Commonwealth University
Overview” 2016). VCU is not only one of the most diverse university in the
Commonwealth of Virginia, but is also one of the nation's most diverse
schools – especially when the size of its student body is considered. About
5% – almost 1,600 – are international students hailing from over one
hundred different countries. VCU’s President, Michael Rao, said that,
“Diversity is absolutely essential at a research university, just as it is in life.
It is an indispensable part of the learning process. It shapes what we learn
and how we learn it, how we solve problems, how we interact with one
another, and how we think about ourselves and each other” (“Division for
Inclusive Excellence” 2016). It is clear that one of VCU’s goals in focusing so
much on diversity is to create a more tolerant and open-minded student
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body that is accepting of those from different backgrounds. In contrast,
another Virginia university, Christopher Newport University (CNU), is less
diverse: CNU’s student body is approximately 75% white, with no other
racial or ethnic group constituting more than 10% of the university
population (“Christopher Newport University Overview” 2016). This does
not necessarily indicate a flaw or a benefit in either school, but the contrast
does provide an opportunity to investigate how different levels of diversity
and different attitudes towards diversity can impact one’s tolerance.
This paper explores whether or not a diverse campus actually has
positive correlation with tolerance. Does exposure to individuals of
different races, ethnicities, cultures, and religions cultivate a sense of
tolerance in the students? The principles of the intergroup contact theory
would suggest that the answer to this question is yes: additional intergroup
exposure allows both groups to overcome prejudices and work to develop
positive attitudes towards each other (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp
2006). In fact, under appropriate conditions, interpersonal contact is one of
the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between members of different
groups (Merino 2010). Considering that universities are intended to
promote friendship, human interaction, and collaboration in addition to
learning and research, there is no doubt that a college environment falls
under the category of “appropriate conditions” for interpersonal contact.
Exposure to greater amounts of racial and ethnic diversity helps not only to
increase tolerance, but also to reduce stereotyping and other negative
intergroup perceptions and interactions (Harell 2010; Rapp 2015; Rapp &
Freitag 2015). For these reasons, it is expected that students attending
more diverse schools should report higher levels of social and political
tolerance.
7
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Many studies have previously demonstrated a link between high levels
of ethnic and racial diversity and high levels of ethnic tolerance, showing
that racial prejudice tends to be lower in the environments of ethnoracially mixed schools (Janmaat 2012). This study does not seek to
challenge this well-researched link, but rather expand on it by
incorporating religion and culture as well. By defining diversity as not just
the ethno-racial heterogeneity, but also the religious and cultural
heterogeneity, an analysis of the correlation between diversity and
tolerance can point to the variables that have a greater impact: it may be
that religion matters more than race in the perception of groups. Especially
considering that the United States is less secular than many
demographically similar European countries, it is not unreasonable to
presume that religion could play a large role in intergroup tolerance within
the U.S. This is consistent with the current hypotheses of this study:
students attending more diverse schools and those exposed to a more
diverse environment should be more socially and politically tolerant
towards groups that are different than their own.
This study surveys college students about their personal levels of
tolerance as well as the volume and frequency of their involvement in
intergroup contact in order to demonstrate the relationships between
diversity and tolerance. By comparing the results between highly diverse
universities, such as VCU, and more homogeneous ones, such as CNU, it
becomes easier to understand the relationship between tolerance and
diversity in addition to potentially identifying other factors that could
impact either of these two variables. The importance of this is that it has
the possibility to shed light on the potential effects, both positive and
negative, of diversity. Alternatively, the results could suggest that a diverse
8
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campus in and of itself does not have a noticeable effect on increasing
tolerance, rather that those who choose to attend diverse schools are
already more tolerant. Regardless, with diversity becoming a major focus of
many schools, organizations, and even businesses, it becomes increasingly
necessary to understand how and why diversity and being in a diverse
environment affects people’s attitude and behavior. While this study is
incapable of establishing a causal relationship, it does have the potential to
find correlations between diversity and tolerance which can then prompt
experimental research to find cause-and-effect relationships between the
two variables.
Tolerance as a whole has multiple facets to its fundamental
importance in society. The significance of political tolerance is evident; a
lack of tolerance for other groups and a lack of respect for the legal and
civil rights of other groups has a strong negative effect on a democratic
society and hinders the effectiveness of the political system. Social
tolerance is less wide-scale and often involves individual perceptions of a
group or a subset of a group rather than how two different groups perceive
each other. Due to this, it may be argued that political tolerance is of
greater normative importance than social tolerance; however, it is both
difficult and uncommon to have one without the other. Overall, for a
nation that is both as diverse and democratic as the United States, at least
a moderate level of both personal and political tolerance is necessary for
society to adequately function.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: a review of the
literature regarding diversity and tolerance and the respective theories
about the relationships between the two is provided, followed by a
detailed explanation of the methodology, outlining the conceptualization,
9
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operationalization, and measurement of the variables. The findings and
results are then outlined and summarized, followed by a conclusion that
completes the paper.

Literature Review
Past research on tolerance has offered many different perspectives
and conclusions, including various definitions of the concept of ‘tolerance’
itself. Tolerance can be split up into multiple parts (i.e. social vs. cultural vs.
religious vs. political tolerance); in this study, political tolerance is more
focused on accepting others’ legal rights whereas social (personal)
tolerance is centered on respecting other individuals, focusing on
interpersonal over intergroup relations (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus 1982;
Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). Another way of splitting up the concept
of tolerance involves distinguishing the object on the receiving end of the
tolerance, whether it be a group of people, an action or set of actions, or
values. In general, research involving tolerance is most focused on
tolerance towards objectionable or minority groups (Sullivan et al. 1982;
Rapp & Freitag 2015). Many authors consider tolerance to be a “willingness
to put up with” something that they previously or currently reject or
oppose, thus implying that tolerance can only exist after a sense of
objection or disapproval has been formed (Sullivan et al. 1982; Harell 2010;
Rapp 2015). This perspective on tolerance offers a somewhat pessimistic
view, assuming that tolerant individuals were initially intolerant. It also
implies that tolerance is only an issue in society if an objection to a certain
group or idea exists (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus 1979). A more openminded approach would be to define tolerance as being prepared to
respect, or at least acknowledge, the social, civil, and political rights of
10
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others (Gibson 1992; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). For the purpose of
this study, this second definition will be used for tolerance, as it is not
required that students have a previous or existing aversion towards any
given group in order to be tolerant towards them.
Tolerance, as a variable, is inherently difficult to measure consistently.
As tolerance is almost always a dependent variable in studies related to the
concept, it is often measured through the use of subjective survey
questions. Sullivan et al. (1979) pointed out that simply asking respondents
about their feelings about a certain group or idea allows the respondents’
political beliefs to act as a confounding variable, and so their answers may
not accurately reflect their level of tolerance. In order to solve this issue,
respondents first must be allowed to specify the group which they oppose
the most, or their ‘least-liked group,’ and only then should they be asked
questions regarding their feeling about that group in particular (Sullivan et
al. 1979; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). This “content-controlled”
method has become the norm, as it offers the least-biased approach to
determining tolerance as defined by Sullivan et al. (1979): a “willingness to
put up with” ideas, groups, or values that one rejects. The same three
authors put this method to the test when they compared this contentcontrolled measure, which used each respondent’s least-liked group, to
Samuel Stouffer’s method (Sullivan et al. 1982). In 1954, Stouffer found
high levels of intolerance in the United States directed at atheists,
communists, and socialists, but the later-identified issue with his study is
that he asked all respondents how they felt about these groups –
overlooking the potential for bias (Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1982).
However, this bias actually led to an increase in tolerance in Stouffer’s
research: when Sullivan et al. (1982) compared their content-controlled
11
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study to Stouffer’s data, they found significantly lower level of tolerance –
presumably because respondents were now being asked about the group
they opposed the most. This suggests that using the method presented by
Sullivan et al. (1982) provides a more accurate measure of tolerance; many
studies since then have also come to this realization and asked respondents
about their least-liked group before asking questions about tolerance (see
Harell 2010; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015; Rapp 2015; Rapp & Freitag
2015). “Broader” questions that do not specify a group toward which the
respondent may or may not be tolerant, and instead refer to other groups
as a whole, can also avoid this bias.
When discussing tolerance towards a minority group that is gaining in
size (e.g. immigrants or refugees), there are two main schools of thought as
to how attitudes of members of the majority towards the minority group
are formed. Both of these are mentioned in Rapp’s studies, in which the
relationship between tolerance and diversity with regards to volunteer
associations and immigration are investigated (Rapp 2015; Rapp & Freitag
2015). The first school of thought is the ethnic competition thesis, which
offers two separate explanations for how competition and hostility forms
against expanding minority groups such as immigrants (Hwang and
Murdock 1991; Rapp 2015). The first explanation draws on the intergroup
conflict theory, which simply emphasizes individuals’ preferences to
interact with those most similar to themselves, and states that hostility is
merely a personal situation (Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin 2010; Rapp 2015). The
implication of this idea is that there exists an overall negative association
with people who are different. The economic threat thesis expands upon
this idea, arguing that hostility towards minority groups and the size of
minority groups increase simultaneously, largely due to real or perceived
12
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interethnic competition over jobs and monetary resources (Blalock 1967;
Rapp 2015). In essence, the majority group feels that their political,
economic, and social privileges may be at risk because of the increasing size
of the minority group (Rapp 2015). The second explanation offered by the
ethnic competition thesis involves both the social identity and group threat
theories. Not only do members of the majority consider themselves
superior to members of the minority, but they are also more willing to
grant rights to members of their own group, and intergroup conflict over
economic or political resources is likely to increase (Hjerm 2007; Rapp
2015). Overall, the ethnic competition theory takes both these perspectives
into account when observing increased hostility and competition between
majority and minority.
This contrasts heavily with the second school of thought: the
intergroup contact theory. According to this theory, an expansion of the
minority group should be accompanied by an increase in tolerance from
both groups as a result of increased opportunities for interaction between
the groups (Rapp 2015). In practice, additional intergroup exposure allows
both groups to overcome prejudices and work to develop positive attitudes
towards each other (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). According
to Merino (2010), under appropriate conditions, interpersonal contact is
one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and
minority group members. This has multiple potential causes, such as the
exposure to a variety of political perspectives offered by exposure to
members of different groups and therefore increasing tolerance, or that
increased social diversity enhances ability to deal with conflict or the taking
of new perspectives – both skills necessary to increase tolerance (Harell
2010). Multiple authors’ research support this theory, finding that
13
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individuals actively engaged in socio-economically, ethnically, and
ideologically heterogeneous associations are more likely to be truly
tolerant toward other groups, as are those who belong to more diverse
networks and are therefore exposed to greater amounts of racial and
ethnic diversity (Harell 2010; Rapp 2015; Rapp & Freitag 2015). Other
authors question this theory, insisting that the effects of group
identification and group conformity are significant enough to prevent any
kind of overall adjustment of a group’s attitude towards another simply on
the basis of contact. Without denying that intergroup contact does
positively affect interpersonal relations and attitudes, critics of the
intergroup contact theory contend that these effects are very limited, and
that the overall mentality of the group is not significantly affected by
individual interactions, thus preventing elimination of intergroup prejudice
solely through social contact (Forbes 1997). Other researchers emphasize
heavily the environment of the contact, noting that intergroup contact in
negative situations or unfavorable conditions “may increase prejudice and
intergroup tension” and that the attitudes and personalities of the
individuals involved as well as the “characteristics of the contact setting”
are all factors contributing to the enhancement and inhibition of intergroup
contact’s effects (Amir 1976; Stephan 1987; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006).
Ultimately, critics of intergroup contact hypotheses are unable to
consistently demonstrate that contact does not reduce prejudice,
especially at the individual level (Pettigrew et al. 2011). Thus, taking both
its support and criticisms into account, the intergroup contact theory is the
best candidate for the primary theory on which this study’s hypotheses are
based. This is further explained in the “Hypotheses” section of this paper.

14
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Diversity, like tolerance, is a very subjective statistic; however,
diversity is more of a relative statistic than an absolute one. A country with
a wide variety of different cultures, religions, and ethnicities, all fairly
evenly distributed (i.e. no one group of any kind holds a majority), can be
said to be much more diverse than a country with a ninety percent white
and Christian population. That said, although there is a lower bound on
diversity (e.g. a country where all citizens are essentially the exact same),
there is no concrete upper bound – and so diversity as a variable must
always be discussed and compared relatively rather than absolutely.
Janmaat (2012) investigated classroom diversity in England, Sweden, and
Germany and its effect on both tolerance and participation. In order to
measure diversity, the ethnic fractionalization index, computed using the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, was used in order to enumerate the level of
diversity of a population (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, &
Wacziarg 2003). Other authors, such as Qian (2013), who studied diversity
and tolerance and their effects on business and entrepreneurship, and
Dowd (2016), who examined religious diversity and religious tolerance, also
utilized the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as it applies to diversity in order to
quantify this variable. In this sense, diversity is defined as the sum of the
squares of the population shares of each group, in proportion to the
average population share, accounting for the probability of two randomly
selected people from the same population belonging to different groups
(Alesina et al., 2003). In general, this method is the most preferred for
quantifying diversity of a large community as an independent variable, as
long as accurate and up-to-date demographical statistics are available. The
only issue with quantifying diversity in this manner is that it fails to take
into account whether any given individual actually experiences diversity.
15
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For this reason, factoring in perception of diversity may provide a better
estimate of the true levels of intergroup contact that one experiences.
Dowd’s (2016) research involved analyzing how religious diversity
affects the likelihood that communities encourage or discourage respect
for religious freedom. When comparing the impact of religious observance
on respect for religious freedom across four settings, it was found that
religious observance had a more positive impact on respect for religious
freedom in the most religiously diverse and integrated of the four settings.
The data suggests that religious segregation, rather than religious diversity,
inhibited religious-based support for religious tolerance (Dowd 2016). This
falls in line with the contact theory; interaction between different religious
groups serves to reduce prejudice between them. For example, even small
amounts of contact with Muslim-Americans often leads to greater
tolerance of their culture and beliefs (Nacos & Torres-Reyna 2007; Merino
2010). On the other hand, segregation is likely to only enhance prejudice
and hinder the fostering of tolerance (Dowd 2016). Merino’s (2010)
research takes a different approach, using diversity as a dependent variable
and examining responses to religious diversity at the national and
community level within the United States. Nearly ninety percent of
respondents either strongly or somewhat agreed that religious diversity
has been good for America; this suggests that theologically exclusive beliefs
held by a substantial percentage of Americans are a significant hurdle to
the full inclusion of non-Christians in American society, and like Dowd’s
(2016) research, it supports both the intergroup contact theory and
Berger’s (1967) hypothesis that the coexistence of multiple religions
ultimately “erodes” religious beliefs by bringing people with different
beliefs into contact (Merino 2010). Nevertheless, this erosion process can
16
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be hindered by strict religious groups with “theological exclusivity” that
generally discourage interaction with those who do not belong to their
religious sect (Berger 1967; Merino 2010). It is important to take factors
such as culture, ethnicity, and sociopolitical status into account in addition
to

religion

when

examining

diversity,

partially

because

simply

differentiating people based on religion leads to ignoring other aspects of
the individual, like the factors listed above, which link them to members of
other religious groups.
One study that specifically focused on the effect of diversity on
tolerance was Janmaat’s (2012) investigation of classroom ethno-racial
diversity and how it affects both tolerance and participation. In this study,
the ethnic fractionalization index was used to measure ethnic diversity
(Alesina et al. 2003). This index takes both the number of ethnic affiliations
and the size of each group into account. Similarly to Rapp’s (2015) study,
Janmaat identified two contrasting theories on the relationship between
diversity and tolerance: the intergroup conflict theory and the intergroup
contact theory (Putnam 2007; Janmaat 2012; Rapp 2015). The conflict
theory focuses on the idea of the majority group perceiving the minority
group(s) as a threat. Thus, tolerance and size of the minority group have a
negative correlation and hostility to minority groups is at a low in
homogeneous societies (Blalock 1967; Janmaat 2012). The second theory,
the intergroup contact perspective, offers a much different view of
intergroup relations and the effects of a homogeneous society. According
to this theory, isolation serves as a breeding ground for stereotypes,
usually negative, and the best way to overcome prejudice is to allow for
intermingling of diverse groups (Janmaat 2012). There are, however, a set
of prerequisites for this to be most effective: the groups must be equal in
17
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terms of rights, they must share common experiences and goals, and the
contact between the groups must be frequent and continuous (Allport
1954; Gurin, Nagda, & Lopez 2004; Janmaat 2012). Generally, in academic,
community, and societal situations, these conditions are met, and because
of this, the concepts of the contact theory can reasonably be applied. In
Janmaat’s (2012) study, a positive effect of classroom diversity on ethnic
tolerance was found in schools in Sweden and Germany, which is in
agreement with the contact perspective on inter-ethnic relations. Ethnic
majority students in Germany and Sweden turned out to have significantly
more tolerant views on immigrants, the minority group, when their
classrooms were more diverse (Janmaat 2012). Despite this, Janmaat’s
hypothesis was not supported due to a lack of consistent link in diversity.
The effect of diversity varies, and country-specific factors certainly do
influence the effects of interethnic tolerance.
Another study focusing on the relationship between tolerance and
diversity was conducted by Rapp and Freitag (2015), in which the process
by which associational diversity relates to the formation of tolerance is
investigated, along with the importance of associations as schools of
tolerance. Similarly to Janmaat’s (2012) study on tolerance in European
classrooms and Rapp’s (2015) study on cultural diversity and tolerance in
Swiss municipalities, Rapp and Freitag (2015) advocate for the contact
theory, wherein consistent contact in diverse settings acts to reduce
prejudice and increase tolerance towards opposing groups. In their study,
active involvement in volunteer associations and its relationship to
tolerance is examined and the data showed that as levels of diversity
increased, the likelihood of intolerance in an individual declined. One
unique aspect of this study is that while Rapp and Freitag (2015) used the
18
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well-established ‘least-liked group’ method (Gibson 1992), or ‘contentcontrolled’ method (Sullivan et al. 1982), to measure tolerance, they chose
a different approach to measuring diversity, instead subjectively capturing
perceived diversity among respondents to the survey in order to
operationalize their independent variable (Rapp & Freitag 2015). They
found that those actively engaged in socioeconomically, ethnically, and
ideologically heterogeneous associations are more likely to be truly
tolerant towards other groups; however, as the length of exposure to such
a diverse environment increases, tolerance was shown to somewhat
decline (Rapp & Freitag 2015). This gives credence to the aforementioned
competition thesis: it is possible that prolonged exposure to minority
groups allows individuals to witness these groups expand and become a
perceived threat to the majority, as explained by the group threat theory
(Hwang and Murdock 1991; Hjerm 2007; Rapp 2015). In general, however,
the intergroup contact theory is the best approach in this study of the
relationship between tolerance and diversity, particularly because the
length of a college education is not sufficient to meet the definition of
“prolonged exposure” to the point of a decline in tolerance.

Hypotheses
The primary reason to focus on the intergroup contact theory over the
ethnic competition thesis when forming a hypothesis is that school is, at all
levels, far more of a collaborative environment rather than a competitive
one. Every student has the chance to graduate and be successful, and other
students’ successes does not change that opportunity. Additionally,
throughout the process of attending the forty or more classes usually
necessary to graduate from a four-year institution, one will generally be
19
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exposed to a wide variety of different people. Of course, the level of
diversity of this group is highly dependent on the size and demographics of
the school, but one of the goals of this study is to show that students who
attend universities that are large, diverse, or both are often quite tolerant
of those who are different from them, either in race, religion, culture, or
background. Past political tolerance research supports this, suggesting that
exposure is likely to increase the cognitive skills that lead to greater levels
of tolerance (Harell 2010). Furthermore, the necessary conditions outlined
by Allport (1954) for intergroup contact to have positive effects are all
adequately met in a university environment: different groups hold equal
status, they share common goals, they cooperate between each other, and
they all have the support of authorities – in this case, university officials,
professors, and staff. The essential question of this study asks how the
amount of diversity on college campuses affects students’ tolerance of
different cultures, beliefs, or backgrounds. Taking the principles of the
intergroup contact theory into account, two clear hypotheses can be
logically formulated as follows:

H:
1

Students that attend more diverse colleges and are exposed to

more diversity should demonstrate higher levels of political tolerance
towards different religious and ethno-racial groups.

H:
2

Students that attend more diverse colleges and are exposed to

more diversity should demonstrate higher levels of personal tolerance
towards individuals of different religious and ethno-racial groups.
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Methodology
The intergroup contact theory suggests that those with more direct
contact and exposure to groups of people different from their own will be
more tolerant of these different groups. Additionally, college campuses
provide a perfect environment for contact between wide varieties of
groups. With these two statements in mind, the hypotheses of this study
are formed, stating that students attending more diverse universities
should demonstrate higher levels of both personal and political tolerance
for different religious and ethno-racial groups. In order to test these
hypotheses, an online survey is designed to be distributed by college
professors to their students to obtain a representative sample of students
at three Eastern universities: Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU),
Christopher Newport University (CNU), and Mars Hill University (MHU).
These three universities each present a different environment: VCU is by
far the most diverse, with 49% of its student body being nonwhite. MHU, a
small, private, Christian university, is less diverse, with slightly over one
third of its students being students of color. CNU, while being less racially
diverse than Mars Hill, offers a more religiously diverse student body, as it
is a public school with no religious affiliations. The anonymous, online
survey asks respondents a variety of questions: first, about personal
information such as their religious and racial background, as well as their
length of attendance at their current school. Next, they are asked about
how diverse they perceived their own environment to be: friends, classes,
and school as a whole. Respondents are also quizzed with questions about
various religious and ethnic groups and foreign countries to determine
their level of religious and cultural literacy. Finally, respondents complete a
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series of questions to determine their levels of both personal and political
tolerance. For more details on exact survey contents, see Appendix.
The independent variable of this study is diversity; however, this is
split into several different variables in order to create a more
comprehensive and detailed regression analysis. In total, there are eleven
predicting variables used for linear regression, each drawn from different
sections of the survey. The first of these is Perception of Diversity, which
represents the perceived diversity of the respondents’ environments, as
described in their survey responses. This variable receives a value between
1 and 5, with a higher value indicating a more diverse environment; this
score was determined based on answers to questions about the racial,
ethnic, and religious diversity of the respondent’s friends, classes, and
school as a whole. The second is Importance of Diversity, which uses
respondents’ answers to questions about how they personally felt about
diversity to assign them a score between 1 and 5, with higher values
indicating a more favorable view of diversity and a higher importance. The
next two variables, Religious and Cultural Literacy, are drawn from the
results of the religious and cultural literacy quiz embedded in the survey.
Respondents were asked twelve questions total on the quiz; six about
religious groups, texts, and traditions, and six about the culture of certain
countries and ethnic groups. The value for these variables are from 0 to 6,
each representing the number of questions the respondent answered
correctly in the corresponding section. This variable helps to explain their
exposure to diversity by testing their knowledge of other religious and
cultures. The fifth variable is Length of Attendance, assigned a value from 1
to 5, with a larger number corresponding to more time spent at the school.
This is factored in because if a school is a diverse environment, and being in
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this environment affects tolerance, then the amount of time spent in that
environment should also affect tolerance. The remainder of the predicting
variables receive a value of either 0 or 1, making them dichotomous
variables: the first of these are Race/Ethnicity and Religion. Since
White/Caucasian and Christian serve as the majority in each category
respectively, not just in the survey results but also in the general
population, they are considered the majority group in this context, and so
respondents who selected White/Caucasian as their Race/Ethnicity receive
a value of 0 for that variable, and respondents who select Christian as their
Religion receive a value of 0 for the religion variable. Those who selected a
race or ethnicity other than White/Caucasian receive a score of 1 for the
race/ethnicity variable, and those who selected a religion other than
Christianity receive a score of 1 for the religion variable. The next variable,
titled “Born in US,” simply gives respondents a score of 1 if they were not
born in the United States, and a 0 otherwise. The last few variables are
derived from questions about with whom the respondents live or have
lived: there are three variables under this category, one each for whether
or not the respondent lives or has lived with a non-related individual of a
different race, ethnicity, or religion. Each of these receive a value of 0 or 1,
where 1 indicates that they did live with someone who was of a different
race/ethnicity/religion. As a whole, this set of variables is intended to best
demonstrate which factors that play into diversity have the highest
correlation with increased tolerance. Both diversity and intergroup contact
as a whole are difficult to measure, but when split up into the individual
parts, it is easier to see the relevance of each aspect of these concepts.
The dependent variable of this study is tolerance; the primary purpose
of the survey is to measure each respondent’s level of tolerance. A
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common approach to testing tolerance involves questioning respondents
about their ‘least-liked group’ in order to remove bias and focus on a group
that the respondent actively dislikes rather than one they are indifferent
about. This method defines tolerance as a “willingness to put up with”
something that they previously or currently reject or oppose (Sullivan et al.
1982; Harell 2010; Rapp & Freitag 2015). This approach does have its own
issues; in this case each respondent’s tolerance score is heavily dependent
on whether or not there exists a group they can define as ‘least-liked’ and
their ability to identify this. Especially in a college environment, as is the
case with this survey, it is not unreasonable to assume that students, who
tend to be more tolerant than older adults, may struggle with choosing a
racial or ethnic group that they strongly object to in any way. For this
reason, a more open-minded approach to defining tolerance, one that does
not imply a preexisting rejection of a group, may be better for this study. In
this sense tolerance can be defined as the state of being prepared to
respect the social, civil, and political rights of others (Gibson 1992; Bloom &
Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). The risk of this definition is that it often
accompanies questions about specific groups (e.g. Muslims, Syrian
refugees, etc.) rather than generalized questions about groups that are
different from the respondent; this presents a clear opportunity for
confounding variables as respondents who have exposure or belong to the
group in question will provide a different perspective from those who do
not. The solution to this issue is general questions that do not focus on any
specific group, whether it be a minority or a dominant group, presenting
questions that ask about respondent’s feelings, perceptions, and opinions
of groups that are different from their own as a whole. This avoids the
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potential bias that comes with asking about a specific group while still
giving an accurate estimate of an individual’s tolerance level.
Tolerance, as the dependent variable, comes solely from the survey
results. In this study, tolerance is split into two categories: personal
tolerance and political tolerance. Personal tolerance, or social tolerance, as
it can also be called, is the tolerance of the inherent diversity of large social
groups or communities (Dima & Dima 2016). Individuals that are more
socially tolerant are more comfortable interacting with different groups
and would be less likely, for example, to refuse to go on a date with
someone solely on the grounds of their race or ethnicity. Political
tolerance, on the other hand, can be defined as accepting “the full legal
rights” of an individual or group of individuals, “regardless of how
dangerous or repugnant” their views might seem to be (Sullivan et al. 1982;
Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry 1996; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). In total,
respondents are asked twelve questions about political tolerance and eight
questions about personal tolerance; each question had five answer options
receiving a score from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating higher
tolerance. The scores for all of the questions for each section are averaged
together to get two values between 1 and 5 to represent each
respondent’s personal and political tolerance. Since all of the variables
assume a numerical form on a similar scale, the data is modeled using a
simple linear regression to determine correlation between diversity and
tolerance. The results and analysis of this regression as well as other
conclusions that can be drawn from the data are outlined and explained in
the proceeding Results section.
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Results
Table 1: Model Summary for Political Tolerance

Model

R
.689a

1

R Square

Adjusted R Square

.475

.424

Std. Error of the Estimate
.488059

a. Predictors: (Constant), Lived with different ethnicity?, Born in US?, Importance of Diversity,
Religious Knowledge Quiz Score, Lived with different religion?, Length of Attendance, Religion,
Race/Ethnicity, Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score, Perception of Diversity, Lived with different race?

Table 2: Model Summary for Personal Tolerance

R
Model
1

R
.612a

Adjusted R

Square

Square

.375

.315

Std. Error of the Estimate
.548209

a. Predictors: (Constant), Lived with different ethnicity?, Born in US?, Importance of Diversity,
Religious Knowledge Quiz Score, Lived with different religion?, Length of Attendance, Religion,
Race/Ethnicity, Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score, Perception of Diversity, Lived with different race?

Table 3: Coefficients for Political Tolerance

26

Margaret Hemenway
Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

Model
(Constant)

B

Std. Error

2.036

.330

Perception of Diversity

-.051

.069

Religious Knowledge Quiz Score

-.022

Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score

Beta

t

Sig.

6.162

.000

-.058

-.741

.460

.039

-.044

-.561

.576

-.002

.037

-.003

-.041

.968

Importance of Diversity

.403

.056

.548

7.256

.000

Race/Ethnicity

.018

.110

.013

.162

.872

Religion

.451

.095

.350

4.757

.000

Born in US?

-.404

.177

-.170

-2.289

.024

Length of Attendance

-.040

.039

-.076

-1.014

.313

Lived with different religion?

-.045

.117

-.028

-.384

.702

Lived with different race?

-.135

.182

-.104

-.741

.460

Lived with different ethnicity?

.202

.177

.154

1.146

.254

a. Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance

Table 4: Coefficients for Personal Tolerance
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Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

Model
(Constant)

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

5.914

.000

2.195

.371

Perception of Diversity

.170

.078

.187

2.177

.032

Religious Knowledge Quiz Score

.003

.044

.005

.062

.951

Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score

-.080

.042

-.161

-1.929

.056

Importance of Diversity

.249

.062

.328

3.979

.000

Race/Ethnicity

-.055

.124

-.038

-.444

.658

Religion

.396

.106

.298

3.719

.000

Born in US?

-.077

.198

-.031

-.387

.699

Length of Attendance

-.006

.044

-.010

-.129

.898

Lived with different religion?

.082

.131

.049

.624

.534

Lived with different race?

.025

.204

.018

.120

.905

Lived with different ethnicity?

.243

.198

.179

1.224

.224

a. Dependent Variable: Personal Tolerance

Two regression analyses were run, the results of which are shown in
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 above. Tables 1 and 3 pertain to the first regression
analysis, comparing the predicting variables to the first dependent variable:
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political tolerance. Table 1 depicts the R-squared value of 0.475 suggests
that 47.5% of the variance in respondents’ political tolerance scores can be
predicted from the eleven independent variables, which are outlined in the
methodology section and listed below the table. Table 2 shows that the
strength of association for personal tolerance is not as strong; the Rsquared value of 0.375 suggests that 37.5% of the variance in students’
personal tolerance scores can be predicted from the explanatory variables.
This is a flat decrease of ten percentage points between political and
personal tolerance, insinuating that diversity and the factors that compose
it better explain the former than the latter; however, which predicting
variables actually significantly affect the tolerance variables differs
between the two.
The standardized and unstandardized coefficients of each predicting
variable as well as the statistical significance of each are shown in Tables 3
and 4, for political and personal tolerance respectively. At a significance
level of α=0.05, the following variables are significant predictors of political
tolerance: Importance of Diversity, Religion, and Born in US. Of these,
Importance of Diversity has the greatest effect on political tolerance, as its
Standardized β (Beta) value of 0.548 is greater than that of Religion (0.350)
and Born in US (-0.170). In fact, because the Born in US variable received a
value of 0 for those born in the United States and 1 otherwise, the
unstandardized B-value of -0.404 suggests that respondents born outside
of the US scored an average of 0.404 points lower out of 5 on the political
tolerance section of the survey. The positive unstandardized B-values for
Importance of Diversity and Religion indicate the following: first, an
increase of 1 point of the Importance of Diversity variable suggests a
corresponding increase of 0.403 points for the political tolerance variable
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(both are on a scale from 1 to 5). In other words, the average difference in
political tolerance between a student with an Importance of Diversity score
of 1 and one with a score of 5 would be 1.612 – a fairly significant number.
Second, a similar trend is suggested by the B-value for Religion: as this
variable was dichotomous, it only received a value of 0 or 1, with 0
corresponding to Christian and 1 otherwise; the average difference
between political tolerance scores of non-Christians versus Christians was
0.451, implying that non-Christians are somewhat more tolerant than
Christians. The fact that the survey was fairly evenly distributed between
non-Christians and Christians strengthens this assumption; see Table 5 for
the distribution of religion of respondents. This data is not sufficient to
support the first hypothesis of this study because Perception of Diversity
did not correlate positively with political tolerance, H is not supported by
1

the data.
Table 5: Religion Frequency Table

Freq

Per

Valid

Cumulative

uency

cent

Percent

Percent

Christian

70

55.6

55.6

55.6

Not Christian

56

44.4

44.4

100.0

Total

126

100.0

100.0

For personal tolerance, the statistically significant predicting
variables were somewhat different. At a significance level of α=0.05, the
variables Perception of Diversity, Importance of Diversity, and Religion
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were all statistically significant. This suggests a few noteworthy things.
First, a diverse environment only has a meaningful effect on personal, or
social, tolerance, but does not affect students’ perceptions and opinions of
the legal rights of groups different from their own. Second, while being
born outside of the United States actually correlates with a slightly reduced
political tolerance, it has no significant effect on personal tolerance,
meaning that foreign-born students have different perceptions on the legal
rights of different groups than American-born ones, but maintain similar
perceptions of different groups on a social and personal level as compared
to American-born respondents. Of these three significant variables,
Importance of Diversity is once again the strongest predictor, indicating
that of the variables factoring into diversity, the importance of diversity to
each respondent has the greatest correspondence with higher tolerance.
With an unstandardized B-value of 0.249, as shown in Table 4, it is
suggested that a student who indicated that diversity was extremely
important to them (received a score of 5 for this variable) would, on
average, have a personal tolerance score 0.996 points higher than one who
indicated that diversity was entirely unimportant to them (received a score
of 1 for this variable). Similarly to political tolerance, the B-value Religion
variable demonstrates that non-Christians are more tolerant; they receive
personal tolerance scores 0.396 points higher on average compared to
Christians. The Perception of Diversity variable is statistically significant
with regards to its ability to predict personal tolerance. Specifically, the
unstandardized B-value of 0.170 suggests that respondents who reported
that their environment was extremely diverse (received a score of 5 for this
variable) would, on average, have a personal tolerance score 0.68 points
higher than those who reported that their environment was very
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homogeneous (received a score of 1 for this variable). Recall that the
second hypothesis of this study is that those students that attend more
diverse colleges and are exposed to more diversity should demonstrate
higher levels of personal tolerance for different religious and ethno-racial
groups; for this hypothesis to be supported by the data, the Perception of
Diversity would have to display a statistically significant positive correlation
with personal forms of tolerance. Because it is statistically significantly
positive in predicting personal tolerance, the second hypothesis is
supported by the data.
While the variables mentioned and analyzed above are the only
statistically significant predictors of tolerance, examination of the
statistically insignificant variables can still provide insight into trends
related to diversity and tolerance. First, Tables 3 and 4 show that Cultural
and Religious Knowledge has essentially no correlation whatsoever with
either form of tolerance. Not only are neither of them statistically
significant in either regression, but the B-values for these predictors are
consistently very close to 0. On the other hand, the Lived with Different
Ethnicity variable has a moderately large B-value in both regressions;
however, it is statistically insignificant in both as well. This suggests that if
the data set was larger, whether or not the respondent lived with someone
of a different ethnicity may actually have been a noteworthy predictor of
both forms of tolerance. This is interesting for multiple reasons: first, in
neither case was the Race/Ethnicity variable a significant predictor of
tolerance, and second, none of the other ‘Lived with’ variables had Bvalues as large as that of this one, and the other ‘Lived with’ variables were
far less statistically significant as well (even greater p-values).
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The data resulting from this study’s survey and the preceding analysis
suggest several correlations. One of which being that of the personal
characteristics reported, a student’s Religion is the best predictor of
tolerance. Second, one’s opinion of diversity is a strong predictor of
tolerance as well; this may be unsurprising, as those who are tolerant of
other groups should have no qualms with diversity, but it does lend
support to the validity of the results of this study. Finally, contact with
groups different from one’s own, as represented by the diversity of one’s
environment, only demonstrates a positive correlation with personal
tolerance, indicating that opinions of the legal rights of other groups are
likely not affected by intergroup contact. Furthermore, students born
inside of the United States show a better respect for the American concept
of equal rights for all citizens, as the Born in US variable demonstrated a
negative correlation with political tolerance, hinting that immigration may
be a source of intolerance in more ways than one.

Conclusions
First, it is important to note that this is a preliminary study in which a
small fraction of the overall populations of the universities participated,
and so the results may not be generalizable to the entire student bodies.
That said, the principles of the intergroup contact theory are somewhat
supported by the results of this study, as the data show that higher levels
of social tolerance correspond to a more diverse environment. The fact
that political tolerance does not correlate with a more diverse environment
is not necessarily surprising; previous research has suggested that while
intergroup contact usually lowers prejudice at an individual level, it can fail
to do so at a group level of analysis (Forbes 1997; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006).
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In essence, social tolerance is more of an individualized concept, especially
in the context of this study. Individuals considered more personally tolerant
are those who reported that they were more likely to interact with
members of different groups and would be more comfortable doing so. On
the other hand, political tolerance is more of a group attitude, shaped by
the members of a given racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural group, rather
than a select few individuals. Research on group psychologies supports this,
noting that intergroup attitudes can only be changed after intergroup
relations have adjusted, and an improvement in relations between some of
the individual members of each group is not sufficient to make this change
(Forbes 1997). This distinction between intergroup and interpersonal
attitudes offers a reasonable explanation for why Perception of Diversity is
a significant, positively-correlated predictor for personal tolerance, but an
insignificant predictor for political tolerance. Interacting with other groups
impacts how one personally treats and perceives certain members of
different groups (i.e. their friends), but is not sufficient to uproot deepseated political beliefs that have been reinforced for years by their family
and their environment (Pettigrew 1998). Further research may be needed
to determine which environment is best suited for the adjustment of
political beliefs and increase of political tolerance.
There are many other questions raised by the results of this study.
According to common theories about how intergroup contact increases
tolerance, a behavioral and attitude improvement towards different groups
results from repeated contact in a variety of settings, and repetition of
intergroup encounters makes them more comfortable (Jackman & Crane
1986, Pettigrew 1998). A diverse university environment would seem to fit
this description, yet neither personal nor political tolerance was
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significantly impacted by length of attendance, which would best indicate
the overall time spent interacting with members of different groups – a
student who has attended a school for two years has had twice as much
time to interact with members of different groups than a student who has
only just attended for one. Another interesting question is why the results
indicate no correlation between knowledge of different ethnic and religious
groups: generally, being familiar with the traditions and principles of other
groups suggests a more informed perspective on said group, whether this
leads to a more positive or negative opinion of them. Overall, the majority
of research on tolerance does not take religious and cultural literacy into
account, thus further research is required to make meaningful conclusions
about these variables.
Some of the results of this study, while not predicted by the
hypotheses, are in line with expectations set by current polls and research.
For example, the Born in US variable had a statistically significant negative
correlation with political tolerance; this is supported by multiple
international surveys of political tolerance. Americans are more tolerant
than any other country’s citizens when it comes to freedom of speech and
press, even for those that they disagree with (see Wike & Simmons 2015;
Wike 2016). As political tolerance involves respecting the legal rights of
those that one disagrees with, it is unsurprising that individuals tolerant of
the right of those with opposing views to share them are also more
politically tolerant. Additionally, the fact that the Perception of Diversity
variable had a statistically significant positive correlation with personal
tolerance is exactly what the intergroup contact theory would predict:
being in a diverse environment and being surrounded by members of
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different groups corresponds to being more tolerant of the members of
those groups, at the very least at an individual and interpersonal level.
The most important takeaway from this study is that religion was a
main predictor of both types of tolerance, personal and political. This is
noteworthy because the majority of studies that have examined the
relationship between diversity and intergroup tolerance in the past have
pertained to ethno-racial groups only, essentially focusing on the more
visible human characteristic of appearance, which is generally very heavily
impacted by race and ethnicity. Many of these studies have demonstrated
a link between high levels of ethnic and racial diversity and high levels of
tolerance, showing that prejudice tends to be lower in the environments of
ethno-racially mixed schools (Janmaat 2012). A distinct lack of research on
religious tolerance in schools in the United States exists. Some researchers
have investigated countries as a whole, such as Dowd’s (2016) findings that
religious segregation severely inhibits tolerance in the case of Nigeria, but
surveys or experimental studies on religious diversity and how it affects
tolerance within the United States are few and far between. The findings of
this study suggest that those who are non-Christian (i.e. in a minority
religious group in the US) are more tolerant, both politically and socially, of
groups different from their own. This presents a significant opportunity for
further research, such as investigations as to why Christians in the U.S.
seem to be less tolerant than their non-Christian counterparts.
Overall, the hypotheses that students that attend more diverse
colleges and are exposed to more diversity should demonstrate higher
levels of tolerance for different religious and ethno-racial groups was
somewhat but not entirely supported by the results. Perception of Diversity
did correlate positively with personal tolerance, and a positive opinion of
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diversity correlated positively with both forms of tolerance, but this is not
sufficient to fully support both hypotheses – only H can be said to be
2

sufficiently supported by the data. Taking these results and past research
into account, it seems that the best avenue for further research is to
investigate religion and how one’s religious beliefs and upbringing impacts
not just their religious tolerance, but their tolerance of different ethnoracial groups as well.
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Identity and Social Movements: Analyzing Social Movement Participation
through Identity Theory
Mariah Hines, Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
This paper investigates the potential relationship between the strength of
one’s social identities and their likelihood to support social movements
structured around those identities, as well as the relationship between social
identity and an individuals’ proclivity to participate in such movements.
Drawing on social identity theory, this paper looks at social identity from a
number of angles—the paper investigates strength of social identities such as
race, gender and sexuality, and analyzes them in relation to support for, and
active participation within, current movements and groups dedicated to
creating policy change for those groups.
Introduction
Social movements have long been avenues of radical social
change. While earlier social movements focused on political
representation or Marxist class-based struggles, recent studies of social
movements show a new trend based on social identity. From the civil
rights movement of the 1960s to the feminist movement of the 1980s,
social movements have existed for decades as a way in which identity
groups fight for equality.
Identity-based social movements have been incredibly influential in
inciting social change. For example, during the 1960s, change regarding
African American social rights was largely made possible by the works of
identity-based groups such as the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC). These groups, and many others, were effective in mobilizing African
Americans and other sympathizers to support legislative and social
change. As identity-based social movements rose to prominence in the
1980s, similar achievements were made in advancing women’s rights and
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LGBTQ rights. For this reason, social movements are viable mechanisms by
which to ignite change.
The study of social movements is normatively important to the field
of political science because participation in social movements is a
characteristic of societies with high levels of democracy (Della Porta,
2015). In addition, participation in social movements is indicative political
participation, as those who participate in social movements are also likely to
participate in political activities such as lobbying, canvassing, and voting
(Cisar, 2015). Moreover, social movements are signs of a country’s political
landscape, and can potentially foretell regime change and political
revolution (Goodwin & Rojas, 2015).
As identity-based social movements are some of the most influential
movements regarding political change, this paper will seek to answer the
question, “Why are individuals motivated to participate in identity-based
social movements?” Utilizing identity theory and theories of identity
salience and interdependence, this paper will conduct a survey and analyze
collected data to answer the research question. Additionally, this paper will
explore the implications of the data analysis and suggest several future
research trajectories.

Social Movement Participation: Macro-Level Theories of Participation
Over the past several decades, the study of social movements such
as environmentalism, women’s rights, and LGBTQ rights has led to an
increasingly diverse range of theories. Theories behind social movement
participation range in scope from macro to micro, oftentimes building upon
previously established theories (Della Porta & Diani, 2015). There are three
primary macro-level schools of thought regarding participation in social
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movements: political process theory (PPT), resource mobilization theory
(RMT), and identity theory (IT) (Della Porta & Diani, 2015).
Scholars of the first primary theory, political process theory (PPT),
propose that participation in social movements is based on the individual’s
perception that their political and governmental institutions offer
opportunities for social change (Della Porta & Diani, 2015). This theory
considers the accessibility of political and governmental institutions as the
motivating factor for social movement participation. According to PPT, in
societies where political and governmental institutions are closed off,
restrictive or unlikely to respond to change, people are less likely to
participate social movements. Likewise, Political Process theorists assert
that within societies where political and governmental institutions are
flexible and open to change, people are more likely to participate in social
movements. PPT asserts that people participate in social movements based
on their belief that their governmental institutions will be open to the
changes that they desire (Cisar, 2015) (Della Porta & Diani, 2015).
Scholars of the second primary theory, resource mobilization theory,
argue from a similar perspective of strategic motivation (Della Porta & Diani,
2015). RMT maintains that individuals participate in specific social
movements opposed to others simply because those specific movements
offer incentives (ranging anywhere from career-related benefits to
monetary goods) for participation. RMT theorists maintain that if an
individual perceives that a social movement offers incentives for benefits
that the individual does not already have, the individual is more likely to
participate in that social movement. In this sense, individuals participate in
certain movements based on the financial or professional incentives that the
social movement offers (Della Porta & Diani, 2015).
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Finally, scholars of the third primary theory, identity theory, assert
that participation in social movements is based on the individual’s identity
(Della Porta & Diani, 2015). Identity is often described in terms of a
collective group identity, and identity theorists assert that “movement
participation [is] an expression of identification with a group” (Klandermans,
2015). IT identifies four competing micro-level theories of motivation:
collective identity theory, “crushed” identity theory, competitive identity
theory, and connected identity theory, which will be discussed later in this
study.

Macro-Models of Rational/Strategic Participation
From a strictly abstract level, both PPT and RMT operate from a
rationalist perspective. In brief, rationalist models contend that individuals
are rational actors that are moved to participate based on “individual selfinterest” (Oliver 2015, p 246). PPT asserts that for individuals living in
societies in which the governmental and political institutions are open and
accessible, it is rational to participate in social movements. For individuals
living in societies that are antithetical to the ones previously mentioned, it is
rational

for

individuals

to

refrain

from

participation

in

social

movements. For PPT theorists, it is only rational to participate in social
movements if governmental and political institutions are open to
change. (Eder, 2015).
Similarly, RMT asserts that an individual’s participation in a social
movement is based on a rational assumption that participating in a social
movement will lead to access to resources and benefits unattainable without
participation in that movement (Della Porta and Diani, 2015). For example,
according to RMT theorists, it would be rational for an individual to
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participate in a social movement that offered financial incentives for
joining. It would similarly be rational for an individual to participate in a
social movement if that movement offered an opportunity for a desirable
job or position.
As rational theoretical models, both RMT and PPT imply that an
individual’s decision to participate in a social movement is based on a
strategic perception that participation in social movements will in some way
benefit the individual personally. These benefits are weighed on a system of
“pros and cons”. According to both theories, individuals participate only
when they believe that the gains of participation in the social movement
outweigh the costs of participation. For PPT and RMT theorists, individuals
must weigh the potential gains (political change or financial incentives,
respectively) of participating in successful movements with the potential
costs (social stigmatization, exacerbated discrimination, loss of social
standing) that participation may accrue should the movement fail.
For these reasons, RMT and PPT have often been linked to gametheory explanations of social theory (Eder, 2015). According to some critics,
RMT and PPT are oversimplifications of individual behavior, as they reduce
individual behavior in terms of basic, two-level structures (Eder, 2015). In
doing so, they paint an incomplete narrative; in fact, scholar Klaus Eder
claims that these models are “theoretically deficient since [they are] based
on a short cut between the individual actor and social institutions.” (Eder,
2015, p. 41). In other words, both RMT and PPT create broad generalizations
that are not useful in understanding the complexities of social movement
participation.
Moreover, although PPT and RMT establish factors that lead an
individual to act rationally, they are limited in explaining irrational action
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(Eder 2015). PPT and RMT are only truly applicable when an individual is
acting in self-interest, but there are many scenarios in which an individual
could choose to participate in a social movement even when participation is
not related to the individual’s own self-interest. For example, rationalist
models oftentimes have difficulty explaining participation in civil rights
movements. Scholar Pamela Oliver specifically highlights the inability of
rationalist models to explain motivation and participation in the American
civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, wherein individuals who
openly participated in these movements risked substantial physical, social,
and economic harm to achieve civil rights. For many rationalists, the
potential benefits of achieving civil rights would not obviously outweigh the
costs of participation. Rationalist models of self-interest such as PPT and
RMT do not account for situations when an individual acts even when it is
not obviously beneficial to do so. Oliver asserts that to understand why
individuals participate in movements in which the pros do not obviously
outweigh the cons, one must evaluate motivations for participation at a
deeper psychological level (Oliver 2015). A more in-depth understanding of
social movements is necessary for this study; therefore, this study will not
utilize PPT and RMT as explanatory factors for social movement
participation.

Identity Theory: A Non-Rationalist Theory of Motivation
A deeper understanding of the psychological motivations of social
movement participation can be found within the third primary macro-level
school. Scholars of the third primary theory, identity theory, assert that
participation in social movements is based on the individual’s identity (Della
Porta & Diani, 2015). Often, identity is described in terms of a collective
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group identity, and identity theorists assert that “movement participation
[is] an expression of identification with a group” (Klandermans, 2015). IT
identifies four competing micro-level theories of motivation: collective
identity theory, “crushed” identity theory, competitive identity theory, and
connected identity theory.
Identity theory differs from the prior two theories in that it places
emphasis on perceptions of individual identity. Identity itself refers to an
individual’s own perception of his/her social relationship within a given
context or environment (Stryker, 2015). Identities can be construed either
broadly or narrowly, and it is common for individuals to form more than one
identity (Stryker, 2015). In addition, identities may change over time, and
often vary in importance based on situational context. Identity may also be
extended to include the collective group, or may be limited entirely to the
self and the individual (Stryker 2015).
Identity theory works to identify behavioral choices and seeks to
analyze why exactly individuals choose to do certain things; according to
identity theory scholars, all behavioral choices are based on the individual’s
perceived identity. In explaining social movement participation, identity
theory and its subsequent micro-theories are important because they work
to explain the complexities of individual motivations. These theories also
work to explain the reasons why individuals participate in movements as
well as why individuals may abstain from such participation (Stryker,
2015). As the research question in this study is specifically targeted towards
participation in identity based social movements, identity theory is the most
relevant theory, as it allows the research to better understand motives of
participation in identity-based social movements from a more complex level.
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Micro-Level Theories of Motivation
As previously mentioned, there are four micro-level theories of
motivation, which, for the sake of the research, will be referred to
throughout this paper as the “Four Cs”. As all of the following theories fall
under the umbrella of identity theory, many of them employ similar
arguments and concepts. Nevertheless, it is useful to define each theory
individually as certain concepts within these theories will be used to
conceptualize other terms later in this study.
The first “C” theory is that of collective identity. Within this theory,
individuals are motivated to participate based on their perception that they
share a common identity with those members of the social group. According
to scholar Verta Taylor, “collective identity is the shared definition of a group
that derives from its members’ common interests in solidarity” (Taylor,
1989). Scholars of collective identity theory assert that it is a powerful
motivational method, as it allows individuals to connect with a larger group
or community. When individuals identify beyond the “me” and connect with
the “we”, they are likely to be more motivated to participate in a social
movement. Identity as a collective concept is thought to lead to social
change because it fosters collectivization of resources, ideas, and goals
(Stryker, 2015). Though collective identity theory is helpful in understanding
group mobilization, it does little to explain instances of identity
intersectionality, and is thus too broad to utilize within this study.
The second “C” theory is that of “crushed” identity. Within
“crushed” identity theory, also referred to as “rejection/stigmatized”
identity theory, individuals are motivated to participate in an identity-based
social movement based on their perception that this particular identity has
been stigmatized or rejected by society (Kaplan & Liu, 2015). Scholars
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Howard Kaplan and Xiaru Liu describe this theory as a “coping” mechanism
for those that identify with stigmatized groups (2015). Within their study,
they find that those that identify with a group that has been stigmatized in
the past join social movements in order to improve their own perceptions of
these stigmatized identities (Kaplan & Xiaru, 2015). More simply put, Kaplan
and Liu assert that individuals are likely to join identity-based social
movements if it increases their own self-esteem (2015).
Within this theory, Liu and Kaplan extensively focus on the role that
emotions, particularly shame and pride, play in an individual’s decision to
participate in a movement. For many members of stigmatized groups, low
self-esteem is attributed to the shame that comes from discrimination and a
perception of being the “other”. Shame, according to Liu and Kaplan, later
turns to anger, which is the primary motivating factor that leads to
participation. This anger is usually directed towards members of the
majority group, who are perceived as possessing some right that the
stigmatized majority does not have. Anger is later transformed to pride; Liu
and Kaplan state that “anger... creates pride by booting participants out of
hiding and into a public arena of collective action” (2015, p. 259). Pride then
raises self-esteem; in this way, participation in social movement leads to the
“crushed” individual feeling in some way redeemed or validated. However,
while this theory is useful in understanding the role that self-esteem,
positive perceptions, and stigmatization play in the motivational process, it
is not vastly useful to the study because it is targeted specifically towards
stigmatized identity groups and is therefore limited in scope.
The third “C” theory is that of competitive identity theory. Within
this theory, individuals have a hierarchy of several salient identities, and
individuals participate in a social movement based on identity salience
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(Stryker, 2015). Specifically, Scholar Sheldon Stryker states that “The theory
proposed that choice among behaviors expressive of particular roles reflects
relative location in a salience hierarchy of identities associated with those
roles.”(Stryker, 2015, p. 28). Saliency, as used in Stryker’s study, refers to
the relative importance of an identity when it is considered amongst other
identities. For example, if an individual feels that their gender identification
is more important than their racial identification, gender identity may be
considered more salient within that individual. To Stryker, relative identity
importance is key to motivation towards participation; the more important
the identity is to an individual, the more motivated an individual is to
participate in a social movement related to that identity (Stryker, 2015).
In Stryker’s view, individuals constantly reevaluate the relative
importance of each identity they hold; in some cases, identities may conflict,
and an individual may have to choose between two competing
identities. Say, for example, that a person is made to choose between
participating in a rally benefiting one identity based social movement, and
an organized march benefiting another identity based movement. All other
matters (pros/cons) being equal, Stryker asserts that the individual will
participate in the activity that aligns with the identity they consider to be
most personally important.

In this respect, identity salience and

participation in social movements are reciprocating in the sense that
individuals participate in movements because of their saliency, and
participation itself increases the saliency of that identity (Stryker, 2015). For
example, if an individual who identifies strongly as a feminist attends a
feminist political rally, the relative importance of that individual’s feminist
identity is made stronger by the act of participating (Stryker, 2015). An
increase in identity salience causes an increase in motivation, making
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competitive identity theory an effective way of understanding identity and
its relationship to motivation. A potential within this theory is that it is
somewhat circular in nature. Still, the correlation between salience and
participation exists in nearly every study using salience as a variable; thus,
this paper will assume that the saliency theory is valid.
The fourth “C” theory is that of connected identity theory. Within
this theory, individuals participate in social movements based on their
perception that they are interdependent with the members of the social
movement. Scholar Rupert Brown defines interdependence itself as the
perception that “one person’s experiences, actions and outcomes are linked
in some way to the experiences, actions and outcomes of others in the
group.” (Brown, 1988, 27). Connected identity theory is split between two
forms of interdependence: task interdependence and fate interdependence.
Task interdependence, according to Brown, refers to the belief that
one shares a common goal with members of a group (1988). Task
interdependence could be applied to any scenario in which the success or
failure of each individual member of the group is dependent on the success
of the group as a whole (Brown, 1988). Brown states that while task
interdependence is an essential factor in all group interaction, it does not
necessarily rely on social identity (Brown, 1988). For this reason, task
interdependence will not be useful in this study because it does not
necessarily pertain to social identities. The second form of interdependence,
interdependence of fate, is more useful to this study. Interdependence of
fate, according to scholar Kay Deaux, refers to “the belief that one’s own
destiny is shared with similar others.” (Deaux, 1996). Deaux uses social
movements based on ethnicity, gender, and sexuality in order to extrapolate
on this theory. In her view, individuals who identify with these groups
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generally have the perception that legislation or social stigmas targeted
towards the group as a whole is also targeted to themselves (Deaux,
1996). Similarly, the success of one member of the group is viewed to be
beneficial to the group as a whole. Say, for example, that an individual
identifies herself as a member of the lesbian community. A bill enacted
specifically targeting gay men might not necessarily directly affect the
individual. However, if the individual perceives herself as having a linked
fate with all members of the LGBTQ community, the individual may
nonetheless feel strongly motivated to participate in a movement against
that particular bill. Interdependence, therefore, helps to explain why
individuals are motivated to participate in social movements even when they
are not directly targeted.

Social Movement Participation through a lens of Identity Importance and
Interdependence
To answer the research question at hand, it is necessary to utilize a
theory that is nuanced and narrow in scope. While other micro and macro
level theories present sound and cogent arguments, many are too broad in
scope to be applied at the level of identity-based social movements. In
addition, the previously mentioned rationalist theories are overly simplistic;
because of this, applying these theories throughout this research paper
would not produce the detailed results needed for proper analysis. For
these reasons, this paper will primarily utilize identity theory. The final two
theories discussed, competitive identity theory (Salience) and connected
identity theory (Interdependence), are most pertinent to the research
question that this study seeks to explain. These theories are most useful
because they both account for reasons why an individual would participate
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in a social movement, and reasons why an individual would choose not to
participate in a social movement. In addition, these theories work from an
individualistic level rather than a macro level, which enhances the ability of
this study to be applied at a detailed level.

Data and Methodology
This study will conduct a survey in order to collect and measure data
based on both interdependence and salience. Surveys are beneficial in
identity studies because they allow the respondent to respond openly and
honestly. Surveys are preferable to case studies or experiments because
they allow researchers to ask specific and direct questions related to their
primary research question. Surveys can be adapted to fit many research
questions, which aids the researcher in collecting specific data points. While
surveys may sometimes be weakened by confusing language or word
structure, this study seeks to minimize that bias by presenting the questions
in a clear and coherent manner. As a whole, surveys enable researchers to
have a more nuanced understanding of the respondent’s actual beliefs
(Abdelal et al. 2009) (Sylvan and Metskas, 2009). This study’s survey will be
administered via SurveyMonkey.com to students attending universities in
Southern and Northern plain-states

Identity: Measurement and Conceptualization of Key Variables
This study utilizes two primary independent variables: level of
identity salience, and level of perceived identity interdependence. The
primary dependent variables are level of participation in an identity-based
social movement and level of support of an identity-based social
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movement. As data will be collected based on the respondent’s perception
of their own identity, the unit of analysis for this study will be individuals.
The first independent variable (IV1) is level of salience. This variable
is directly related to competitive identity theory, and is conceptualized as
the relative importance of a held identity in respect to other held
identities. While there is no definite way to measure importance, several
academic studies suggest that importance can be measured by presenting
the respondent with a list of commonly held identities and asking the
respondent to rank each identity based on an ordinal scale (Brady & Kaplan,
2009).

This

study

will

follow

a

similar

method

of

measurements. Respondents will first be given a list of nine social identities
and will then be asked to list the importance of each identities on a scale of
1 – 10, with 1 being “not important at all” and 10 being “extremely
important”. This variable will be coded using an ordinal scale, where 1
represents an extremely low level of identity importance, and 10 represents
an extremely high level of identity importance. This scale will measure
general identity importance; that is, the importance of an identity when not
compared to other identities. Then, respondents will be given the same list
of identities and will be asked to rank the personal importance of each
identity as they relate to each other, with the rank of “1” signaling the
identity they hold personally most important. As the SPSS data analysis
program I will be using for this study traces variables from low to high, this
variable will be coded so that a score of “9” represents the most important
identity, and a score of “1” represents the least important identity. Taken
together, these scales will allow me to analyze an individual’s level of identity
salience.
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The second independent variable (IV2) is level of perceived
interdependence. This variable is directly related to connected identity
theory, and is conceptualized as the level of “linked-fate” perception, or, the
extent to which the respondent believes that their individual fate is
dependent on the fate of other members of an identity group. Fate, in this
study, will be conceptualized from a perspective of success/failure. Most
studies of linked fate use ordinal scales to measure this variable because it
allows for variation in responses (Dawson, 2009). This study will follow a
similar method of measurement. Respondents will be presented with a list
of social identities and will be asked to rank, on a scale of 1 – 10, how much
they feel that they share a similar fate as those in the identity group, with 10
meaning “my success/failure is not at all dependent on the success/failure
of this group” and 1 meaning “my success/failure is entirely dependent on
the success/failure of this group”. This variable will be coded using an
ordinal scale, where 1 represents an extremely low level of perceived
interdependence, and 10 represents an extremely high level of perceived
interdependence.
The dependent variables are level of participation and level of
support. Level of participation is conceptualized as the average number of
times an individual has participated in an identity based social
movement. To measure level of participation, individuals will be given a list
of identity-based social activist groups and will be asked how many times
they have actively participated in that group. These responses will be coded
using interval measurements, with the lowest interval, signifying low levels
of participation, coded as a 0, and the highest interval, signifying high levels
of participation, coded as 4. Each respondent’s interval score will be
averaged to analyze the average level of participation.
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In addition to levels of participation, I will also be measuring level of
support. This will account for respondents who may wish to participate in a
movement, but have never had the opportunity to do so. This variable is
important to the research question because level of support is a possible
indicator of a respondent’s future participation in that movement. To
measure level of support, individuals will be presented with a statement
regarding a social movement’s goals, values, and missions, and will be asked
to indicate their level of support for this statement. The responses will be
coded on a six-point ordinal scale, with the lowest level of support “Strongly
Disagree” being equal to 0, and the highest level of support “Strongly Agree”
being equal to 6.
As it would be nearly impossible to compile a comprehensive list of
every identity-based social activist group, I have chosen to highlight three
social activist groups related to the variables I perceive to be most important
regarding participation: race, gender, and sexuality. The groups I have
chosen are Black Lives Matter (BLM), the National Organization for Women
(NOW), and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC). These groups have been
selected because they are all large, active, and highly influential
organizations related to a particular identity group. In addition, all three
groups have received significant media coverage over the past several years,
and are thus more likely to be recognized by the vast majority of survey
respondents.

Hypotheses
Based on these conceptualizations of the variables, this study will seek to
test the following hypotheses:
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H1: As the level of salience of an identity increases, the level of participation
in and support of a social movement related to that identity increases.

H2: As the level of perceived identity interdependence increases, the level
of participation in and support of a social movement related to that identity
increases.

H3: Individuals are most likely to participate in, or support, an identity-based
social movement if that identity is viewed to be both highly interdependent
and highly salient.

Results & Methods of Analysis
To analyze the survey data, I performed several regression analyses
using the SPSS database.

Within each data set, I controlled for political

science as a major, as this was a variable that could be controlled for within
all cases. As certain survey responses were only available for those of a
certain category (i.e. questions regarding NOW participation/support were
only available for women) I decided to control for the excluded factors within
each subgroup. For the analysis regarding gender participation/support, I
controlled for race and sexual orientation. For the analysis regarding race
participation/support, I controlled for sexual orientation and gender. For
the analysis regarding sexual orientation participation/support, I controlled
for race and gender.
In total, there were 163 respondents to the survey. As females are
overrepresented through the survey data (n = 114), the gendered results
were more robust than either the race related results (n = 29) and sexual
orientation related results (n = 26). Because of the low sample size for black
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respondents and respondents identifying on the LGBTQ spectrum, it is
slightly more difficult to analyze these results with any level of
significance. The results are still included below, as they will be further
analyzed in the discussion.

Gender Results
In regard to the dependent variable level of average participation,
my hypothesis concerning interdependence (Gender LF) and salience (GND
SAL) was largely proven null. As shown in the above coefficients table, both
linked fate and salience are insignificant in determining the average level of
respondent participation in NOW.

The only significant factors in

determining participation in NOW seem to be race and sexuality; specifically,
there is a significant correlation between being black, or being on the LGBTQ

spectrum and participating in NOW. However, because both black
respondents and LGBTQ respondents are so underrepresented within the
data, it is difficult to draw any major conclusions between these control
variables and participation.
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Similarly, in regard to the dependent variable level of support, my
hypothesis concerning interdependence and saliency was proven null. A
cursory glance at the above table would suggest that interdependence and
salience negatively affect support; however, because both variables are
highly insignificant, this effect can be disregarded. The only significant factor
in determining support of NOW would appear to be the general level of
gender importance (Gender IMP). This correlation between general
importance and support of NOW is interesting as it seems to indicate that
female respondents listed gender as being important in general, but not as
important as other identities. Nevertheless, this variable will not be taken
to support my hypothesis, as it has no statistical relation to salience or
interdependence.
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Race Results
In regard to the dependent variable of level of participation, my
hypothesis concerning interdependence (Race LF) and salience (Race SAL)
was again proven null by the race related data. As shown in the above table,
both interdependence and salience were largely insignificant in predicting a
person’s average BLM participation. Both sexual orientation and political
orientation are somewhat significant, and suggest that those that are along
the LGBTQ spectrum and those that are political science majors are more
likely to participate in the BLM movement. However, the total responses for
black individuals identifying as LGBTQ was extremely low (n = 5), thus, it is
difficult to draw a conclusion regarding the correlation between sexuality
and BLM participation. In contrast, the total responses for black individuals
identifying as political science majors appears relatively high (n = 15) when
compared to the total number of black respondents (n=29), which suggests
that those black respondents who were political science majors were more
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likely to participate in the BLM. Still, as shown above, the variable of political
science major falls just beyond the limits of significance, and can therefore
not be used as an accurate predictor of BLM participation.
In regard to the dependent variable of level of support, my hypothesis
concerning interdependence and saliency was proven to be null. Both

saliency and interdependence were found to be poor predictors of an
individual’s support of BLM. There is, however, a significant positive
correlation between gender and participation, which at first glance seems to
indicate that black women are more likely to support the BLM movement
than black men. Nonetheless, this correlation is likely skewed because of
the overrepresentation of black women within the responses; black women
(n=23) made up the clear majority of responses analyzed. Thus, this
correlation can be largely disregarded.
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Sexual Orientation Results
In regard to the dependent variable level of participation, my
hypothesis concerning interdependence (Sexual Orientation LF) and salience
(SO SAL), was yet again proven null. An analysis of HRC Participation resulted
in no significant variables, and suggests that none of my variables were able

to predict levels of participation. As previously discussed, this may be
attributed to the small sample size of respondents who identified along the
LGBTQ spectrum.
In regard to the dependent variable level of support, my hypothesis
concerning interdependence and salience was proven to be null. Neither
interdependence nor salience were found to be significant predictors of
support. From the above table, there is a significant correlation between the
general importance of sexual orientation. Similar to the results for gender,
this would seem to indicate that indicate that LGBTQ respondents, in

general, listed sexual orientation as being important in general, but not as
important as other identities. Nevertheless, this variable will not be taken
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to support my hypothesis, as it has no statistical relation to salience or
interdependence.
Discussing the Results
The results of the data analysis suggest that identity interdependence
and identity salience have no significant correlation with an individual’s level
of participation within a social movement or their support of that social
movement. Several factors could explain this. One potential explanatory
factor is that the sample from which the data was taken was not very
representative. As shown in the graphs within the appendix, the individuals
surveyed were primarily white, heterosexual, and female. While the
abundance of female respondents was beneficial in analyzing gender,
because of the lack of representation amongst racial minorities and those
along the LGBTQ spectrum, it was difficult to fully analyze factors related to
race or sexual orientation.
Across the board, respondents appeared to be supportive of social
movements. 57% (n = 66) of the women surveyed listed themselves as
strongly or somewhat supportive of the National Organization for
Women. 89% (n = 26) of black respondents listed themselves as strongly or
somewhat supportive of the Black Lives Matter Movement. 57% (n = 15) of
respondents that identified along the LGBTQ spectrum listed themselves as
strongly or somewhat supportive of the Human Rights Campaign. In
contrast, average levels of participation were low within all groups. 77% (n =
88) of women had never participated within the NOW. Roughly 50% (n =15)
of black respondents had either participated in Black Lives Matter once, or
had never participated in BLM at all. 46% (n = 12) of respondents that
identified as LGBTQ had never participated within the HRC. This gap
between support of social movements and actual participation within these
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movements suggests that support of a movement cannot be used as a
prediction of participation.
These low levels of participation can possibly be attributed to the age
of the group surveyed. Nearly 90% (n =147) of the respondents identified as
being between 17 and 24 years of age. As young college students, it is
possible that these respondents had other obligations such as classes or
part-time jobs that prevented them from participating in social
movements. Moreover, a lack of participation could have been caused by a
lack of opportunity. While many college campuses generally afford students
the ability to peacefully demonstrate on behalf of a social movement, it is
possible that some campuses intentionally or incidentally restricted
students’ ability to demonstrate. Additionally, a lack of participation could
have been caused from a lack of access. The respondents surveyed may not
have had access to transportation, which would have inhibited their ability
to participate in movements that were based in faraway locations.
Finally, a lack of participation could have been due to the organizations
that I decided to test. While I considered Black Lives Matter, the National
Organization for Women, and the Human Rights Campaign to be very
recognizable and active groups, it is possible that individuals had very little
knowledge of these organizations, which would have prevented their ability
to accurately respond to my questions. In addition, it could be true that an
individual may not have participated within the movements that I chose, but
could have participated in a similar identity based movement. For example,
a respondent identifying as part of the LGBTQ community may not have
participated within the Human Rights Campaign, but may have participated
within other LGBTQ rights organizations such as GLAAD or OutRight
International. As previously mentioned in this paper, it would have been
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nearly impossible to test an exhaustive list of social identity organizations.
However, including additional identity-based activist organizations may have
helped to provide more support to my hypotheses.
Theoretical Explanations
There are several theoretical explanations for the lack of correlation
between identity and participation. One such theory, the free rider problem
(FRP), states that individuals within a collective identity group will not rise to
collective action because of their belief that they can benefit from the
collective goal without actually participating (Olson 1965). This theory is
best explained by economist Mancur Olson, who asserts that collective
action only occurs when individuals must participate in order to receive the
benefits of the common goal (1965). Olson’s theory is expanded upon by
scholar Pamela Oliver. In her study of rational action, Oliver states that a
separate, underlying problem within the FRP is that of efficacy (2015). In its
most basic understanding, the efficacy problem refers to an individual’s
belief that their participation within a collective group will not produce a
noticeable effect (Oliver 2015). Because many individuals believe that their
participation alone is not sufficient enough to produce change, they instead
choose to not participate at all (Oliver 2015).
Theories such as Olson’s FRP and Oliver’s efficacy problem help to
explain the results of the data in that they show why identity
interdependence

and salience

are not

necessarily

indicative

of

participation. An individual might identify very strongly with a certain
collective group, but that individual may choose not to participate in that
movement because they do not believe that their contribution will be
effective, or because they believe that they can receive the collective good
without participating. The respondents surveyed may have participated at
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higher levels if participation was in some way incentivized. Olson suggests
that incentives, and especially material incentives, are powerful factors in
encouraging collective action (1965). However, organizations such as Black
Lives Matter, the National Organization for Women, and the Human Rights
Campaign generally only offer what Oliver refers to as “solidarity incentives”
(2015). Solidarity incentives are those incentives related to social
responsibility and morality; for example, an incentive for participation in
NOW may be the feeling of value and self-worth that a woman might feel as
a result of helping other women. In contrast, material incentives are
generally related to money and other tangible goods; an individual may be
more motivated to participate in a NOW rally for pay-equality because of the
material incentive of monetary gain. Future analysis of identity and
participation should instead take into account the effect of material
incentives on participation; it may be the case that college students, such as
those surveyed, are only drawn to action when they are presented with
significant material incentives for participation.
Scholar Bert Klandermans expands upon Olson’s theory of incentives by
asserting that incentives must be weighed on the basis of perceived costs
and benefits (2015). The benefits of participation are calculated based on
the expected outcomes of the participation and the value of the incentive
(Klandermans 2015). Klanderman stresses that costs and benefits are based
on rational expectations; if an individual expects that a movement is likely to
fail, or that the potential benefits of the movement’s success are invaluable,
then that individual will not participate in the movement (2015). Similar to
the FRP, an individual must also expect that their own participation will be
matched by the participation of others; if this is not the case, then the
individual will be less likely to participate within the movement.
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Klanderman’s theory of costs and benefits help to explain the significant
gap

between

social

movement

support

and

social

movement

participation. When deciding whether or not to participate in the given
social movements, it is possible that many respondents believed one or
more of the following: that the social movement was unlikely to succeed;
that the value of that the collective good/incentive was relatively low; or that
their participation within that movement would not be matched by the
participation of others. The weighing of costs and benefits adds a separate
dimension to factors of identity salience and identity interdependence, thus,
future studies regarding identity and participation should consider the role
that cost and benefits play in mobilizing individuals to participate within
social movements.
Conclusion and Future Research Trajectories
This paper sought to answer the question, “Why are individuals
motivated to participate in identity-based social movements?” Ultimately,
a conclusive answer could not be drawn by using identity theory and theories
of identity interdependence and identity salience. This data suggests that
there is no significant correlation between identity interdependence,
identity salience and social movement participation. Several control
variables such as general importance, gender, and major showed signs of
significance, however, because of the unrepresentative demographics, these
variables were not useful to the research question at hand.
While the hypotheses were largely rendered null by the results of the
survey data, it must be mentioned that this is a preliminary study whose
findings may not be generalizable. There are two important takeaways from
this study. First, the data seems to show that there is a distinct disconnect
between support, participation, and mobilization. The data indicates that
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though respondents had high levels of support for the chosen organizations,
this support was not reflected in the level of participation. The level of
participation is directly related to the extent to which an organization is able
to mobilize individuals to collective action. From the results of this study, it
is clear that organizations cannot significantly mobilize individuals to action
on the bases of identity interdependence and identity interdependence and
identity salience. Thus, identity-based movements must mobilize on the
bases of other, non-identity related factors.
Though this study has refrained from utilizing the previously mentioned
rationalist models of participation (PPT and RMT), to analyze participation,
the results of the data suggest that PPT and RMT may help in analyzing
discrepancies between the hypothesis and the results. Should future
researchers wish to examine this further, it is recommended that they
attempt to include other macro-level theories such as PPT and RMT within
their study. As social movement mobilization is a potential indicator of levels
of democracy it is an important factor to the field of political
science (Goodwin & Rojas, 2015). Thus, it is necessary that future research
focuses on exploring other non-identity based explanatory factors.
Second, the data suggests that participation within social movements is
based on complex levels of decision making that cannot be limited to
identity. While it would be inaccurate to assume merely on the basis of this
study that identity does not play any role within the decision making process,
it is necessary that future researchers closely examine other influential
factors. Potentially influential factors such as emotion have been widely
researched in recent years, and could possibly be used to bridge the gap
between identity and participation (Klandermans 2015; Taylor 2000). In
addition, scholars have recently made efforts to construct integrated
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frameworks of social decision making (Van Zomeren et. al, 2008). This
research is important, as it allows political scientists to develop a more
nuanced understanding of decision making as it pertains to motivation and
participation.
To conclude, this study recommends that future researchers focus on
developing theories that integrate collective identity with other mobilizing
factors. In doing so, future researchers will be able to more thoroughly
explain what factors most contribute to an individual’s decision to
participate in identity-based social movements. Should future researchers
wish to replicate this study, it is recommended that they select from a larger,
more representative sample size so that their analysis will be more accurate
and robust.
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Representative Deviance in the Media: Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)
Through a Queer Lens
Matthew Helton, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
The HIV/AIDS epidemic devastated the American queer community starting
in the early 1980s. To date, hundreds of thousands of queer people have
died from AIDS-related illnesses. Using an original survey experiment, this
paper explores the possible effects of covering the life-prolonging drug PreExposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) through a queer-lens. The paper analyzes the
role of the media in determining public support for, or opposition to,PrEP
based on the way their coverage frames the issue. The paper also examines
whether such framing effects might lead to colder feelings toward the gay
community in general.
Introduction
Does the way the media frames content regarding Pre-Exposure
Prophylaxis (PrEP) influence consumers’ opinions of the medication? More
specifically, does the framing of PrEP through a queer lens influence
consumers’ opinions of the medication? The stereotype that HIV is a “gay
disease” has existed since the epidemic began in the United States in June
of 1981, but scientific evidence only supports the claim that queer
individuals—specifically men—are more susceptible to contracting the
virus due to their means of sexual intercourse. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) asserts that anal intercourse, which is most
commonly associated with men who engage in sexual activity with other
men (MSM), is the highest-risk sexual behavior for HIV transmission due to
the thin lining of the rectum. This is partially the reason why HIV diffused
through queer communities quicker than it did through heteronormative
communities.

This cognitive link between the queer community
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(specifically gay and bisexual men) and the HIV/AIDS epidemic has
permeated through time; therefore, it is possible that PrEP being viewed
through a queer lens, instead of through a general medical lens, in the
media could negatively impact consumers’ perception of the significance
and essentiality of PrEP in combating the global spread of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Whether or not the queer lens is negative is a matter of
interpretation; however, my own repeated first-hand experiences and
cultural background suggests that to view through a queer lens is to view
negatively.
Background Information
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is a malignant virus that
enters the human body via contact with blood, semen, vaginal fluid, or
other bodily fluids. Once inside the body, the virus attacks and destroys
white blood cells known as CD4 cells or t-cells, the purpose of which is to
fight off infection. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is the final
stage of HIV, which causes severe damage to a compromised immune
system. An individual is identified as having AIDS when his or her CD4 cell
count drops below 200, effectively preventing the body from fighting off
any type of infection (CDC.gov, 2016). According to AVERT, a UK-based
international non-profit that provides educational material, there are 36.7
million people living worldwide with HIV, 40% of whom are unaware of
their infected status and an estimated 1.8 million of whom are children
(Global HIV and AIDS Statistics, 2017). Once HIV advances to AIDS, patients
are often diagnosed with various AIDS-related illnesses which are, in the
vast majority of cases, fatal.
There is a common misconception that HIV is a virus that mainly
targets homosexual men, or more specifically, MSM; however, this is not
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true.

AVERT provides a snapshot that encompasses the entire

demographic living with HIV/AIDS, highlighting key populations that are
circumstantially prone to heightened exposure risk, which include MSM,
people who inject drugs (PWID), sex workers, prisoners, transgender
people, women and girls, children, young people and adolescents. The
reasons for heightened exposure to HIV infection is subgroup-specific.
Biological, behavioral, and legal factors expose MSM to risk and often
prevent them from accessing necessary services. PWID are at risk due to
sharing needles, criminalization, marginalization, poverty, and increased
likelihood of imprisonment. Sex workers and transgender people are
disposed to heightened exposure due to social, economic, and legal factors,
such as being prone to injection drug use and inconsistent condom use
among multiple partners, as well as healthcare discrimination. There is
also a lack of programs for these populations because it is difficult to
ensure they will reach those they are intended to service. Inmates in
prisons are exposed to high-risk activities and situations, such as drug use,
sexual violence, and lack of contraceptive availability, that increase their
risk of infection. Females are disadvantaged due to discriminatory cultural
norms that bar them from accessing healthcare and education, expose
them to poverty, and put them at risk of gender-based violence. Children
in specifically vulnerable populations, including but not limited to orphans,
are at risk of being infected through mother-to-child transmission (MTCT).
Young people and adolescents are vulnerable to infection because of
inadequate education prior to the sexual debut (Key Affected Populations,
Global HIV and AIDS Statistics, 2017).
Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) is a daily pill for individuals who
are at ongoing substantial risk of HIV infection, with the preventive
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capabilities for persons susceptible to HIV, including but not limited to
those of the high-risk subgroups mentioned above. The drug contains two
medications that are used to treat HIV, so if an individual is exposed to the
virus through sexual intercourse or injection drug use, PrEP works to
prevent the virus from taking hold in the body. Currently the only PreExposure Prophylaxis on the market is Truvada, manufactured by Gilead
Sciences, Inc. If taken regularly and as prescribed, it can reduce the risk of
HIV infection via sexual transmission by as much as 92%. When used with
other forms of contraception, such as condoms, the risk of HIV infection via
sexual transmission is reduced by almost 99%. When used regularly and as
prescribed, the risk of HIV transmission via shared needle for the purpose
of drug injection is reduced by more than 70% (CDC.gov, 2016).
PrEP’s usage has exponentially increased since its recent approved
by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for prevention in
2012. The drug’s success was put into context via a modeling study
conducted by the Infectious Diseases Society of America that found PrEP
could potentially reduce the amount of new HIV cases among MSM by
more than thirty percent over the next ten years (Jenness et al., 2016,
pp.1800-7). It is crucial to stipulate that PrEP is not a drug exclusively for
MSM. PrEP is a drug for any individual who is at a substantial and ongoing
risk of contracting HIV, including pregnant women or women who are likely
to become pregnant in areas highly burdened by HIV, men who have not
undergone voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC), uninfected
individuals with otherwise compromised immune systems who may
become exposed to the virus, young girls aged 9-14 in sub-Saharan Africa
who are subjected to an increased likelihood of sexual assault, PWID, sex
workers, children who are born to HIV-infected mothers, young
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adolescents in areas highly burdened by HIV, and transgender individuals,
in addition to MSM and other key populations. PrEP’s utility is not
subgroup-specific; it is a useful preventative measure for any individual
who is not infected by HIV but at substantial risk of HIV infection.
According to the World Health Organization, research and trials
have shown that combinations of three or more antiretroviral medications
exist as one of the most effective medical treatments of HIV currently
(HIV/AIDS Fact Sheet, 2017). Without the assistance of insurance, the
universally recognized cost of Truvada is $1,539.00 USD for 30 tablets,
which is roughly equivalent to a one-month supply (Corbin, 2015).
According to UNAIDS, an estimated 2.1 million individuals worldwide
became newly infected with HIV in 2015, including 150,000 children, most
of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa and were infected during pregnancy,
through childbirth, or breastfeeding. 18.2 million individuals living with
HIV, as of June 2016, were accessing antiretroviral therapy (ART), which is
the combination of multiple antiretroviral medications to slow the rate at
which HIV multiplies by making copies of itself in the human body
(HIV/AIDS Fact Sheet, 2017).
When the media references PrEP, it is typically through the lens of
the queer community with a focus on what impact the drug would have on
gay and bisexual men and the rate of new transmissions within that
subgroup (ex. Bahler, 2017; Florencio, 2017; Gottlieb, 2017). Reverse
content analysis, which Exoo (2009) explains looks at the media so as to
determine what stories received no press coverage (p. 2), reveals there is a
small body of PrEP media coverage that focuses on the drug’s impact on
non-queer communities, such as intravenous drug users, marginalized
groups (other than gay and bisexual men), and the general public. This is
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not to say that media coverage of PrEP through these lenses does not exist,
but rather that they are considerably less in number.
It is important to research the way in which media frames coverage
of PrEP, because if the coverage is negatively biased the media needs to be
aware so that an attempt can be made to present information in a more
neutral way. The lens through which the media discusses PrEP is impactful
because representation matters. If PrEP is only associated with the queer
community then it will carry the perceptions of that community with it, be
they positive or negative (though it is fair to say the association with this
subgroup is typically negative). A diversification of association is the best
way to create a balanced view of PrEP in the media. Diversification offers
representation to each group that is impacted by PrEP by allowing them to
evaluate the utility of the medication through the lens of experience for
each specific community. It is through the multiplicity of testimonial that
the public can fully evaluate the merit of the medication. The media
originally reported HIV/AIDS as a gay cancer, and the association stuck.
Other such harmful associations should be avoided at all costs. This
research is necessary because PrEP deserves the opportunity to reach its
full potential unimpacted by the bias or stereotypes that may be associated
with or result from reporting through any specific lens.
Theoretical Discussion
Media framing is the way the media organizes, adds context to,
and presents information to consumers. The concept of framing is broad,
and the process has the tendency to impact the psychological message the
consumer receives. In the specific context of studying PrEP and the way in
which it is framed by the media, it is necessary to highlight the concepts of
representative deviance, cultural bias, and knowledge deficiency.
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Gadi Wolfsfeld (2011) discusses representative deviance in his
book, Making Sense of Media and Politics: Five Principles in Political
Communication. He explains that since the news deals with what is deviant
and unexpected, it logically results in people believing the world is as the
news describes it (p. 50). This concept is often linked with cultural bias,
which Wolfsfeld (2011) explains as every media story being rooted in a
time and place specific to the culture in which it occurs and reflective of its
society’s norms and morals (p. 47). This is significant when discussing
media framing of PrEP because the coverage of the AIDS epidemic in the
early 1980’s identified the virus as a gay-specific malady, which exemplifies
the concept of knowledge deficiency. Wolfsfeld (2011) defined knowledge
deficiency as not knowing the background, jargon, or intricacies of a
particular field due to a lack of focused training (p. 66). When the media
attempts to report on a topic whilst being knowledge deficient, there is a
risk of over-simplification, misrepresentation, or in this case, the creation
of connections between two things that share no explicit association
besides a biological reality. The virus was first called Gay Related Immune
Deficiency (GRID) before it was officially renamed HIV. At that time in
America’s cultural history, members of the queer community were viewed
as being deviant, disruptive, and in some harsher cases, as abominations;
the prevalence of HIV in the queer community during this specific time was
viewed by many to be God’s vengeance on sinners. While societal
attitudes toward the queer community have become more progressive,
there is still a lingering stereotypical connection between HIV and
gay/bisexual men, which is a result of the cultural bias with which the
HIV/AIDS epidemic was originally reported. This cultural bias led to
representative deviance in the reporting of topics and issues regarding
88

Matthew Helton

HIV/AIDS—the epidemic is typically viewed through a queer lens,
contextualizing discussion of the epidemic in its application to the queer
community. HIV/AIDS is not a “gay disease,” as it has often been depicted.
The epidemic disproportionately affects gay and bisexual men, but the HIV
virus is present within and has the ability to impact every demographic in
the world, as was previously discussed. Framing the virus specifically within
the context of the queer community is not only a misrepresentation, but it
also has detrimental repercussions on the scientific advances made to
combat the spread of the virus. If HIV is viewed as specifically and
singularly affecting the queer community, which carries a cultural
stigmatization, any scientific advances that impede the diffusion of the
virus will automatically be viewed with more skepticism by media
consumers because those advances carry the same cultural stigmatization
of the epidemic and its association with the queer community.
Hypothesis


Null Hypothesis 1: When presented with a scenario about
expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will not be less likely to
support proposed legislation when the information is framed
through a queer lens.



Directional Hypothesis 1: When presented with a scenario about
expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will be less likely to
support proposed legislation when the information is framed
through a queer lens.



Null Hypothesis 2: Framing the discussion of PrEP through a queer
lens will not make respondents feel colder toward the gay
community.
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Directional Hypothesis 2: Framing the discussion of PrEP through a
queer lens will make respondents feel colder toward the gay
community.

Methods
The method through which data was collected for this study was an
optional-response survey. The copy of the full text of the survey is
available in Appendix A. The survey consisted of seven questions. Control
variables were addressed by questions regarding exposure to PrEP, level of
exposure, political identification, gender identity, and sexual orientation.
The independent variable is the treatment accompanying the survey that
each individual took. There were two treatment options; one of which
posed a scenario toward the general public, and one which posed the same
scenario, but did so through a queer frame. The survey questions directly
relating to the dependent variables asked the degree to which respondents
supported legislation that would expand public access to PrEP and a feeling
thermometer in regards toward the queer (LGBTQIA+) community.
The survey was created with SurveyMonkey.com via collaboration
between the project creator and the project creator’s professor. 92
individuals responded; however, two responses had to be removed from
the sample because the surveys were submitted with incomplete
questions, which would have resulted in skewed data. The 90 responses
were obtained from two specific survey portals via web submission, with
portal assignment randomly based on date of birth. Each portal had a
different treatment, with 45 respondents reporting to each portal. The
separate treatments, located in Appendix A, were written by the project
creator for the purpose of this project. The responses were manually
coded and entered into a Microsoft Excel Data Sheet. If respondents
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strongly supported the proposed legislation, they were assigned a 0; if they
supported it, a 1; if they moderately supported it, a 2; if they neither
supported nor opposed it, a 3; if they moderately opposed it, a 4; if they
opposed it, a 5; if they strongly opposed it, a 6. When asked to rate their
feelings toward the queer community, if respondents answered 100, they
were assigned a 0; if 85, a 1; if 70, a 2; if 60, a 3; if 50, a 4; if 40, a 5; if 30, a
6; if 15, a 7; if 0, an 8. If respondents had been exposed to PrEP, they were
assigned a 0; if not, a 1. In response to the level of exposure to PrEP, high
received a 0; moderate received 1; small received 2; none received 3. In
response to subjects being asked to place themselves on an ideological
political spectrum, very liberal received a 0; liberal received a 1; somewhat
liberal received a 2; neither liberal nor conservative received a 3;
somewhat conservative received a 4; conservative received a 5; and very
conservative received a 6. Female respondents were assigned a 0, and
male respondents were assigned a 1. Heterosexual (straight) respondents
were assigned a 0, and homosexual (gay) respondents were assigned a 1.
The Microsoft Excel Data Sheet was then uploaded to SPSS software and
analyzed using ANOVA analysis to determine correlation. Regression
analysis was also run for correlation in reference to the demographic
information submitted. The results are analyzed below.
Findings
The data was tested using ANOVA analysis in order to search for
correlations between the independent variable (Treatment Group 1 –
Target; Treatment Group 2 – General) and the dependent variables
(support for proposed legislation and temperature on the feeling
thermometer for the gay community). Regression analysis was used to
search for correlations between both dependent variables and the
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constants (whether or not the respondent had heard of PrEP, level of
exposure to PrEP, political ideology, gender, and sexual orientation); the
results of which are located in Appendix B.
From the research collected, respondents who received Treatment
2, which was not framed through a queer lens, were more likely to support
legislation that expanded public access to PrEP than were respondents who
received Treatment 1, which was framed through a queer lens, but only
slightly and not in a statistically significant way. Respondents who received
Treatment 1, which was framed through a queer lens, were more likely to
feel more warmly towards the gay community when rating their feelings
using a feeling thermometer than were respondents who received
Treatment 2, which was not framed through a queer lens, but not in a
statistically significant way. Additionally, Treatment group 2 had double
the respondents who identified on the conservative spectrum of ideology
than did those in Treatment group 1, which is a possible explanation for
this unexpected result. Survey results are located in Appendix C.
Regression analysis revealed statistically significant correlations
between the dependent variables and constants (demographics). When
viewing the likelihood of respondents to support the proposed legislation
from either treatment group, their level of exposure to PrEP and selfplacement on an ideological spectrum were statistically significant. When
viewing individuals’ temperatures toward the gay community on the
feeling thermometer from both treatment groups, respondents’ selfplacement on an ideological spectrum was statistically significant.
Conclusion
Null Hypothesis 1 (When presented with a scenario about
expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will not be less likely to
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support proposed legislation when the information is framed through a
queer lens.) is accepted, and Directional Hypothesis 1 (When presented
with a scenario about expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will be
less likely to support proposed legislation when the information is framed
through a queer lens.) is rejected. Null Hypothesis 2 (Framing the
discussion of PrEP through a queer lens will not make respondents feel
colder toward the gay community.) is accepted, and Directional Hypothesis
2 (Framing the discussion of PrEP through a queer lens will make
respondents feel colder toward the gay community.) is rejected. It is
important to note that as a preliminary study, these findings from may not
be generalizable.
This study—which presented respondents with two different
scenarios, one creating a link between PrEP and the queer community and
one that did not establish a link to the queer community, before asking to
what degree the respondent supported a miniscule tax increase to ensure
individuals' low-cost access to PrEP—is not representative of the entire
population, and the demographics were skewed female and liberal. The
respondents to the survey were recruited for the project from a personal
network, so there existed a lack of diversity amongst those who responded.
People tend to surround themselves with like-minded individuals from
similar backgrounds as there is a level of comfort in commonality. The
skewed demographic of the respondents impacted the research in two
ways. Women are less likely to have heard of PrEP or be aware of its
association with a particular community, specifically because in the United
States (where the survey was administered), PrEP is mainly marketed to
homosexual men and MSM. This is not to say that PrEP is exclusively
marketed to the aforementioned demographics, as it has been proven that
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PrEP is an effective means of curtailing the risk of HIV exposure to all noninfected individuals, especially those who are at a substantial and ongoing
risk of infection. The other impact of the skewed demographic played out
in political ideology. Liberally-minded persons in the United States tend to
be more accepting of diversity and more willing to advocate for the
government provision of services to groups deemed in need. There is no
guarantee that the skewed demographics of the survey’s respondents
significantly impacted the outcome of the research, but that is one reason
that this question warrants more research and testing, preferably with a
more diverse pool of survey respondents.
Aside from the question being tested amongst a more diverse
group of individual respondents, there are other ways in which the project
could be improved if replicated in the future. The treatment could
establish a more concrete connection between PrEP and an association
with the queer communities, specifically homosexual men and MSM. The
feeling thermometer used in the survey could have options that range from
0 to 100, moving in increments of 1 instead of increments of 10 or 15. The
future project could also strive to determine how viewing PrEP through the
lenses of other communities compares to that of viewing the medication
through a queer lens. This would likely establish the degree of prejudice
that would be expected to accompany the queer lens. There are multiple
other ways in which the project could be changed or improved for future
replication, but these are some of the changes that would likely further
clarify the results by putting them into a more fully-realized context.
In addition to the research question asked in this project, there are
new research questions that should be asked in the future, including but
not limited to the following: What is the most effective way to market PrEP
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that targets key populations without alienating those who would be
responsible for carrying the financial burden of distribution? Which lens is
the most positive through which PrEP is viewed? To what degree does an
association

with

the

queer

community

damage

the

public

image/perception of PrEP’s utility? Even though the hypothesis in this
specific project was not accepted, the research question—What impact
does representative deviance have on the media’s coverage of PrEP,
specifically when that coverage is framed through a queer lens?—warrants
more research and testing. The media’s purpose is to present information
in a neutral way so that the public can be educated on topics of
importance. If the media’s coverage of PrEP is biased in any way, be it
intentional or not, then it should be addressed and attempts need to be
made at rectification. As was asserted earlier, this research is necessary
because PrEP deserves the opportunity to reach its full potential
unaffected by the bias or stereotypes that may be associated with or result
from media reporting through any specific lens.
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Appendix A
Treatment 1: The new Medicaid expansion adopted by 31 states and the
District of Columbia makes it more difficult to obtain Truvada, the
prescription name for a Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP). The expansion of
Medicaid significantly complicates the process individuals go through to
obtain the drug, which is a daily pill that reduces the risk of HIV
transmission during sexual intercourse by more than 90 percent. PrEP
usage has exponentially increased among individuals who are at ongoing
substantial risk of HIV infection since the drug was approved by the FDA for
prevention in 2012. It is believed that PrEP can reduce new HIV cases by as
much as one-third over the next ten years among men-who-have-sex-withmen (MSM), a common term used to describe gay and bisexual men.

Treatment 2: The new Medicaid expansion adopted by 31 states and the
District of Columbia makes it more difficult to obtain Truvada, the
prescription name for a Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP). The expansion of
Medicaid significantly complicates the process individuals go through to
obtain the drug, which is a daily pill that reduces the risk of HIV
transmission during sexual intercourse by more than 90 percent. PrEP
usage has exponentially increased among individuals who are at ongoing
substantial risk of HIV infection since the drug was approved by the FDA for
prevention in 2012.
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Survey:
1. The Department of Health and Human Services has recommended
Congress pass legislation that protects individuals' low-cost access to PreExposure Prophylaxis (PrEP). This will be financed by through a minuscule
tax increase. Please rate your level of your support for this bill.
o

I strongly support this bill.

o

I support this bill.

o

I moderately support this bill.

o

I neither support nor oppose this bill.

o

I moderately oppose this bill.

o

I oppose this bill.

o

I strongly oppose this bill.

2. On the feeling thermometer below, please rate how you feel in regards
to the gay community.
o

100° - Very warm or favorable feeling.

o

85° - Quite warm or favorable feeling.

o

70° - Fairly warm or favorable feeling.

o

60° - A bit more warm or favorable feeling than cold feeling.

o

50° - No feeling at all.

o

40° - A bit more cold or unfavorable feeling than warm feeling.

o

30° - Fairly cold or unfavorable feeling.

o

15° - Quite cold or unfavorable feeling.

o

0° - Very cold or unfavorable feeling.

3. Have you ever heard of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?
o

Yes

o

No
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4. How would you classify your level of exposure to information regarding
Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?
o

A lot of exposure

o

A moderate amount of exposure

o

A small amount of exposure

o

No exposure

5. Where would you place yourself on an ideological political spectrum?
o

Very Liberal

o

Liberal

o

Somewhat Liberal

o

Neither Liberal nor Conservative

o

Somewhat Conservative

o

Conservative

o

Very Conservative

6. Which of the following best describes your gender?
o

Male

o

Female

7. Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation?
o

Heterosexual (Straight)

o

Homosexual (Gay)
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Appendix B
Dependent Variable 1—Support of Legislation
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Dependent Variable 2—Feeling Thermometer towards Gay Community
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Appendix C
Treatment 1 (Target):
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Treatment 2 (General):
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International Legal Recognition after Unilateral Secession: The Case of
Somaliland
Trevor Davis, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
In several ways, Somaliland resembles a state more than Somalia; yet it
does not have international legal recognition as a sovereign state. This
paper examines what legal arguments Somaliland has to unilaterally secede
from Somalia, how lack of international legal recognition is affecting
Somaliland, and why Somaliland has been unable and will likely continue to
be unable to achieve international legal recognition as a sovereign state.
These arguments will be made by examining relevant international law as
well as by examining the rational self‐interests that other states may or
may not have in recognizing Somaliland.
International law neither strictly forbids nor affirms the right to
secede, with affirmation understood as extending international legal
sovereignty of the secessionist state and prohibition understood as not
extending international legal sovereignty. While a secessionist state may
achieve international legal sovereignty via a treaty with the central
government of the rump state, the issue of achieving international legal
sovereignty after unilateral secession is much more complex and difficult to
achieve for the secessionist state (Crawford, 1999). In cases of unilateral
secession, international law seeks to balance two often‐conflicting norms:
the right of peoples to self‐determination and the protection of the
territorial integrity of existing sovereigns. In the case of Reference re
Secession of Quebec, the Canadian Supreme Court found that a people
could achieve international legal sovereignty through secession if their
right to internal self‐determination had been denied or if their secession
resulted in a political reality that other sovereigns recognized (Secession of
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Quebec, 1998). However, even if a state may have the legal right to secede,
that right is not always recognized, as seen with the case of Somaliland.
While Somaliland has historically been denied its right to internal self‐
determination within the state of Somalia and has also existed as a de facto
state since its secession from Somalia, it has yet to achieve international
legal sovereignty (Poore, 2009, pp. 117‐50). This is because legal
recognition is dependent on the self‐interests of other sovereigns who
have the power to recognize or not recognize Somaliland. While the
international community at large has benefited in some ways from the
existence of Somaliland, the self‐interests of regional powers and super
powers is such that international legal recognition for Somaliland is unlikely
(Fisher, 2012, pp. 123‐45).
The circumstances in which unilateral secession is legal are laid out in
the advisory opinion of Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which the
Canadian Supreme Court determined that Quebec had no right to secede
from Canada under the Canadian Constitution. Since there was no right to
secede under domestic law, the Court then examined the questions of
whether or not international law allowed Quebec to succeed from Canada
unilaterally. Proponents of secession brought three arguments to the
Court. First, international law does not specifically prohibit secession.
However, the court found that there is no law that affirms the rights to
secession either, with the exception of the colonized or oppressed peoples.
The second argument brought forth by proponents of secession is that the
right of peoples to self‐determination, understood as a people’s pursuit of
its political, economic, social, and cultural development, is considered a
general principle of international law and has been codified in many
international treaties (Secession of Quebec, 1998). Several UN and regional
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determination, however while many international agreements affirm this
right, the same documents balance it by protecting territorial integrity and
the stability of relations between sovereign states (Bruno et al., 1995).
International law, therefore, is engaged in a balancing act between these
competing interests. As a result, self‐determination should be exercised
whenever possible within the framework of existing sovereign states,
consistent with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states.
However, when internal self‐determination is not possible, a right to
external self‐determination, i.e. secession, may exist. Quebec was not
deemed to have a right to secession, since many Quebecois have held high‐
level government offices and the rights of the Quebecois population at
large have not been infringed upon in any significant way. The last
argument addressed by the Court was in regards to the “effectivity”
principle, which is the legal recognition of a political reality that a sovereign
has been created out of secession (Secession of Quebec, 1998). This
argument claims that since international law does not prohibit secession,
international recognition could help codify sovereignty if such a political
reality existed. The Court stated that if de facto secession occurred, it
would depend on support from the population of Quebec to make the
secession a reality and recognition from other sovereigns could give
Quebec legal status. Revolutions are inherently illegal, but they still occur
and have the ability to create new sovereign entities. An illegal act such as
this may gain legal status through recognition. However, this does not
mean that the act was legal retroactively (Secession of Quebec, 1998).
While Quebec was not deemed to have a right to external self‐
determination, the circumstances surrounding Somaliland are quite
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different. Given the criteria outlined in this case, Somaliland has two strong
arguments for international legal status—it was denied a right to internal
self‐determination, and its existence is a political reality.
First, Somaliland has been denied its right to internal self‐
determination. Despite maintaining international legal sovereignty, as
exemplified by its seat at the UN, Somalia is a failed state with little, if any
control over its territory (United Nations, 2016; Messner et al., 2016). Thus,
the people of Somaliland are unable to exercise their right to internal self‐
determination. The Somali state has no democratic channels that have any
substantial power in which the people of Somaliland could influence
political affairs. There have been attempts to undermine this argument,
such as when President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan appointed two
northerners from Somaliland as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in
2000 (Huliaras, 2002, pp. 168‐75). But again, the government in Mogadishu
is almost powerless, so this did little to influence affairs in favor of the
interests of the people of Somaliland. As the Canadian central government
was unwilling to recognize the secession of Quebec, the Somali central
government is unwilling to recognize the secession of Somaliland (Poore,
2009, pp. 137‐50). In addition to failure by the central state to recognize its
right to secede, Somaliland also has a strong argument in that it was denied
the right to self‐determination even before the Somali state collapsed.
Somaliland has not always been unified with the southern part of Somalia.
Somaliland existed as a distinct colonial territory for 80 years. After colonial
rule ceased, Somaliland was internationally recognized as a sovereign state
for five days before joining the southern, formerly Italian colony on July 1,
1960 (Kaplan, 2008, pp. 143‐57; Huliaras, 2002). While there was a
referendum on unification, it lacked legitimacy. During that vote, sixty
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percent of Somaliland voters rejected unification. However, the southern
Somali population, which was much larger than that of Somaliland, voted in
favor of unification. In effect, the right to Somaliland’s self‐determination
was vetoed. In response, over half of the eligible Somaliland voting
population boycotted the election (Poore, 2009). Those who did vote in
Somaliland voted to maintain the status quo in accordance to customary
international legal practice of uti possidetis; as you possess (Ratner, 1996,
pp. 590‐624; Cassese, 1995).
The second argument for legal recognition has to do with the
“effectivity” principle mentioned in Reference re Secession of Quebec
(1998). In order to explore this argument, which is predicated on a
secessionist movement that has resulted in a de facto state, it is first
helpful to review the various definitions of sovereignty. Krasner (1999)
identifies four types of sovereignty—international legal, Westphalian,
domestic, and interdependence. States may possess some of these forms
of sovereignty and not others. International legal sovereignty, which
Somalia has and Somaliland is seeking, is a matter of authority and
legitimacy, but not control. It is dependent on the practice of mutual
recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal judicial
independence. It allows sovereigns to engage in treaty making, establish
diplomatic immunity, and offers protection from legal action taken in other
states. This form of sovereignty is almost universally desired because it
provides benefits without imposing a cost. Westphalian sovereignty is
defined as political organization based on the exclusion, de facto or de jure,
from authority structures within a given territory (Krasner, 1999). Again,
this form of sovereignty relates to issues of authority and legitimacy, but
not control. In a globalized world, it is worth questioning whether this form
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of sovereignty continues to exist, or whether it should exist (Hannum,
1990). When comparing the Westphalian sovereignty of Somalia and
Somaliland, they both lack Westphalian sovereignty, but in different ways.
Somaliland exists de facto within a territory that Somalia claims. However,
Somalia exists de jure within Somaliland territory, even if it has no control
over that territory. Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal organization
of political authority within a state and the ability of public authorities to
exercise effective control within the borders of their state. This form of
sovereignty involves authority and control, both the specification of a
legitimate authority within a given territory and the extent to which that
authority can be effectively exercised. Interdependence sovereignty is the
ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas,
goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.
Therefore, it is exclusively concerned with control and not authority or
legitimacy (Krasner, 1999).
Compared to Somalia, Somaliland enjoys a higher level of domestic
and interdependence sovereignty; and in almost all accounts, Somaliland
better fits the modern definition of a state. Somaliland has an organized
political leadership. Somaliland has held several democratic elections since
it declared independence, which at times has even included a parliament
controlled by the opposition party. The administration apparatus of the
government of Somaliland has been built from the bottom up, through
integrating traditional norms, values, and relations in combination with
western notions of democracy. This has resulted in a government that is far
more legitimate than the governments of many neighboring states. Its
legitimacy was only bolstered by the fact that Somaliland conducted a
referendum on a constitution that was overwhelmingly approved.
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Somaliland also has the capacity to provide public services, specifically and
perhaps most importantly, security (Walls & Kibble, 2010, pp. 31‐56;
Hannum, 1990; Huliarias, 2002, pp. 157‐82). The government of Somaliland
employs roughly 26,000 people and about 70 percent of the national
budget is used for the maintenance of security forces. There is widespread
ownership of small arms among the civilian population, and the bearing of
arms in public is strictly illegal. Additionally, security forces have destroyed
tens of thousands of landmines. Thus, the security forces play a crucial role
in maintaining stability. Somaliland has a permanent population that is
thought to be between two and three million. Furthermore, the
combination of increased security and a stable government has resulted in
hundreds of thousands of refugees returning to Somaliland (Pegg, 1997;
Kaplan, 2008, pp. 143‐57). Somaliland has a defined territory, over which it
has had effective control for an extended period of time. Its current
borders largely reassemble its borders while it was the British Protectorate
of Somaliland (Huliaras, 2002). Somaliland has even been able to enter in
relations with other states, possessing a high level of international
engagement as an entity relative to other de facto states. This is partly due
to its strategic position on the Horn of Africa as well as its ability to
cooperate with foreign partners in combating terrorism and piracy
(Caspersen, 2015, pp. 184‐92). Nonetheless, international legal recognition
would enhance Somaliland’s ability to engage other sovereigns as well as
international organizations. While many of Somaliland’s governing
structures remain fragile, they are stronger than Somalia’s and surely
demonstrate that the state of Somaliland is a political reality. This leaves
reason for Somaliland to be optimistic, since historically international legal
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sovereignty has typically been achieved through first obtaining de facto
sovereignty (Jackson, 1990).
The lack of international legal recognition has had several negative
effects on Somaliland, the most obvious of which being that Somaliland
does not receive foreign aid from sovereigns that do not recognize it. The
major exception is that the United Kingdom does provide some aid to its
former protectorate. In addition, Somaliland does receive some aid from
NGOs, but is unable to receive development aid from the World Bank and
other international institutions (Caspersen, 2015, pp. 184‐92). Instead, aid
is given to the Somali government in Mogadishu, which does not recognize
the government of Somaliland and thus, does not distribute aid to the area
controlled by Somaliland. However, the minimal amount of foreign aid may
not be entirely negative. As Eubank argues, the lack of foreign aid has made
political leaders more dependent on the local population for tax revenue,
which has made the government bargain with domestic business and as a
result, political behavior has been restrained and more accountable
(Eubank, 2012, pp. 465‐80). Not only does Somaliland struggle to receive
foreign aid, but it is also difficult for the de facto state to borrow money.
Somaliland cannot have direct relations with the International Monetary
Fund or the African Development Bank. While this may not be completely
negative because it prevents Somaliland from getting into debt,
Somaliland’s trade is adversely affected because its central bank cannot
issue letters of credit. In general, Somaliland cannot enter into formal
trade agreements with other nations. Foreign investors shy away from
investment in Somaliland due to a lack of insurance and other investment
protections. As a result, many professionals in the diaspora, who could
greatly benefit Somaliland’s legal, accounting, health, and educational
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systems, are reluctant to return due to Somaliland’s uncertain legal status
(Huliaras, 2002; Kaplan 2008).
International legal sovereignty, by definition, is dependent on
recognition from other sovereigns, so it is important to note what interests
these sovereigns might have in recognizing or not recognizing Somaliland.
As stated above, Somaliland has been willing to cooperate with external
actors to combat piracy and terrorism, which is important given that
Somaliland exists in a region ripe with this problems (Caspersen, 2015).
Also, while external self‐determination may seem like a recipe for
instability and war, it may actually be able to prevent war in this case
(Sureda, 1973). While Somalia is currently in no position to wage war
against Somaliland, it is possible that in the future a stable government
could form in Mogadishu, which may try to reestablish control over
Somaliland. Even if a stable government forms in Mogadishu, it seems
unlikely that Somaliland would be willing to peacefully reunify with its
southern neighbor (Spears, 2003, pp. 89‐98). If that is the case,
international legal recognition of Somaliland may help prevent a war by
making both states subject to the UN prohibition of aggressive war (Poore,
2009). As far as states that might be the first to recognize Somaliland, the
UK seems the most likely, given that Somaliland was formerly a British
protectorate and the UK continues to support it. Within Somaliland’s
region, Djibouti and Ethiopia have both signed agreements of cooperation,
and Ethiopia has even established a trade agreement. These seem to be
the greatest prospects; yet, they fall well short of formal recognition
(Fisher, 2012, p. 123‐45).
The interests of existing sovereigns against recognizing Somaliland
seem to outweigh the interests for recognizing it. Formal recognition from
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Ethiopia is unlikely, as there is a large Somali population in eastern
Ethiopia. There is a concern that any recognition of Somaliland may
encourage the Ethiopian Somali population to once again take up arms in a
secessionist movement (Woodward, 1996). This is a view shared by the
African Union—a union with a long, committed history to respecting
territorial sovereignty. There is a fear that Somaliland’s legal recognition
would increase the weight of claims for secession in other parts of Africa.
Looking at super powers, with the exception of the UK, it appears that
none of the UN Security Council members have any sort of significant
interest in extending legal recognition to Somaliland (Fisher, 2012, p. 123‐
45). While it may seem appropriate for Somaliland appeal to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), it is not a legal state. Therefore, the ICJ,
according to Chapter II, Article 35 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, would be unable to obtain jurisdiction unless the UN the Security
Council made such a request (Statute of the International Court of Justice,
1946, pp. 1318‐31). Given that the crux of Somaliland’s problem is largely
to do with a lack of support, specifically from super powers, it seems
unlikely that the ICJ will be able to exercise jurisdiction over this potential
case. In sum, even if Somaliland has a legitimate case for legal recognition,
finding a forum to present its case is a difficult task that will require other
sovereigns to cooperate and at the moment, it seems that these sovereigns
have little self‐interest in doing so.
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BEYOND THE AXIS OF CONVENIENCE: Re-examining Russian-Chinese
Relations and the Search for Multipolarity
David Hayter, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
Describing Russia’s relationship with China as if it were merely a fallback
option is to underestimate the strength of the political and economic
alliance. This article seeks to provide an overview of the Sino-Russian
partnership, including a comparison of current presidents Vladimir Putin
and Xi Jinping’s personal lives and worldviews. Extensive use is made of
speeches and state media to convey the overlap in national interests as
well as outlines for bilateral cooperation. The overall purpose is to illustrate
that Moscow and Beijing have forged a strong alliance, while discussing
concerns for the future, especially in regards to China’s potential
emergence as a new type of global hegemon.
Contemporary analysis describes the Russia-China relationship as an
“axis of convenience,” with the underlying notion that the US and Europe
still retain global primacy, and that any economic arrangement would be
unequal. This viewpoint underestimates the partnership the two countries
have formed, especially since 2012 under the leadership of Vladimir Putin
in Russia & Xi Jinping in China. Through the extensive use of international
organizations, such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, and the BRICS group of emerging economies, the two states
seek to carry the world away from what they perceive to be a unipolar, USdominated imperialist system based on military coercion, and restore a
multipolar order built on international law, diplomacy and national
sovereignty.
To take a closer look, this article will begin with an overview of the
Sino-Russian partnership, including a comparison of Putin and Xi’s personal
123

Beyond the Axis of Convenience: Re-examining Russian-Chinese Relations and the Search for
Multipolarity

lives, which may serve as the pretext for “a clear personal affinity” that
they feel for each other.[1] Second, the national interests of Russia and
China are explored in detail, referencing especially speeches given by
leaders of both countries, and outlining bilateral cooperation. In order for
the two states to guarantee these mutual interests, they have gone to
great lengths to prove the legitimacy of the partnership across multiple
arenas, namely by the use and creation of international organizations,
which are looked at third. Finally, the conclusion underlines the case that
Moscow and Beijing have forged a strong alliance, and discusses concerns
for the future, especially as regards to China’s potential emergence as a
new type of global hegemon.

Beyond the Axis of Convenience
Though the history of Russia’s partnership with China can be traced
back as far as 1567, the first diplomatic visit on record (which bore no fruit,
as the two travelling Cossacks were denied an audience with China’s
Emperor due to not presenting any tribute)[2] it is more pertinent to the
present question to look at the history beginning after the fall of the Soviet
Union. Up until this time, the relations between the two countries had
swayed, with the most notable extremes in the 20th century being the
communist alliance, and subsequently what are commonly known as the
“Sino-Soviet split” and the Nixon-Kissinger “triangulation” policy.
A pivotal moment came in 1996, with the appointment of Yevgeniy
Primakov as foreign minister of the newly formed Russian Federation. It
was at this point that “national identity tilted sharply away from the West,
with...greater priority for Asia,”[3] as Primakov advised Yeltsin to push a
“Russo-Chinese strategic partnership,” specifically to counter the US and its
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unilateral approach to world affairs.[4]

His disdain for American

interventionism was best seen in 1999 when he famously cancelled a
diplomatic visit to Washington and ordered his plane turned around over
the Atlantic once a NATO strike against Yugoslavia became imminent.
In Bobo Lo’s work titled with the phrase most commonly used to
describe the Sino-Russian relationship, “Axis of Convenience,” he describes
China as the importer exploiting Russia the exporter, particularly in terms
of natural resources, “while Moscow hopes that China will become
[a]...counterweight to the West, Beijing sees Russia as little more than a
resource-cow for Chinese growth and an easy consumer market.”[5] Others,
such as Yun Sun, writing for the Center for Strategic & International
Studies, have described the relationship as perfectly complementary,
matching a textbook example of supply and demand.[6]
It is worth noting that Lo’s book was published in 2008, when trade
between the two countries was around $48.2 billion,[7] whereas Sun wrote
later, in 2015, when trade had nearly doubled, with projections at his time
of writing indicating a total of $100 billion in trade.[8] Additionally, the BRIC
(now BRICS) group was not a formal association, with the first summit not
being held until 2009.[9] Lastly, Russia and China had only performed one
small military drill together under the auspices of the SCO in 2005, whereas
more drills followed in the years to come, including some major firsts for
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, detailed below.
While both Russia and China have appealed to the primacy of
international organizations in maintaining global security and international
democracy, there exist many instances where the two states have
cooperated directly with each other. A lot of attention is drawn especially
to the relatively new tradition of “first visits,” where new leadership in each
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country makes a point to visit the other on their first diplomatic trip
abroad, beginning with former Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2003.[10][11]
This has held true for Putin and Xi,[12][13] and the two have met with each
other much more than with any other nation.

Xi and Putin
One important development in the relationship came in 2012, with
Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency of Russia, and the accession of Xi
Jinping as the president of China. The two leaders have lead somewhat
parallel lives, which may be an explanation as to why they work so well
together, and at such a high profile. The four-way simultaneous
culmination of their two lives with the rising global prominence of their
respective nations has reached an apex that stands poised to revise the
international system in their collaborative vision.
Table 1 highlights the similar backgrounds of Putin and Xi. Their ages
differ by only one year, they both hold doctoral degrees in fields important
to the growth of their respective states - Putin inherited an economically
crippled Russia in 2000; Xi is heading a Communist Party. Each has held
roles in state organizations, with Putin serving in the Soviet Union’s
intelligence agency known as the KGB, and Xi as a member of the Central
Military Commission. Lastly, both were born to veterans of the Second
World War. This is important in the gravity the war holds for both nations,
losing several millions of lives each. As will be explored in more detail
below, the memory of the war brought the two leaders together in major
events in 2015, the 70th anniversary of the war’s end, in which they sought
to remind their people and the world of their resolve, and ability to defend
themselves against foreign aggressors.
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Table 1 (Comparative Backgrounds of Putin and Xi)
Born

Father’s

Education

State employment

PhD in Economics

KGB

PhD in Marxist Law

Central Military

background
Putin

1952

WWII
veteran

Xi

1953

WWII &
Revolution

Commission

veteran
Sources: Vladimir Putin Personal Website; People’s Daily Online, March 30,
2010.

While the two leaders have a great deal in common, they can only
achieve so much if their citizens are unwilling to work together. After all,
what good would a high-speed rail line to Beijing be if nobody were willing
to make the journey from Moscow?[14] A 2015 poll shows China as the
second most favorable nation to Russians, at 43%, coming in behind
Belarus and ahead of Kazakhstan.[15] China’s population, however, shows a
51% favorability rating, one of the highest in the world at the time of
worldwide polling in regards to Russia.[16] This mutual respect extending
beyond leadership makes cooperation not only easier, but also almost
mandatory if a country’s leader is to adequately represent the populace.
Of course, China does not operate as a democracy, and Russia’s status as
such remains contentious on the global stage; however, the leaders
undoubtedly recall the periods of revolution and civil war in their countries,
and see popular uprising in their neighborhoods as well as the Middle East.
While there may not be direct accountability via the ballot box, a certain
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level of indirect accountability theoretically exists, and is far more
dangerous than simply losing votes.
It should also be noted that leadership in both countries have made
moves to influence public opinion in regards to this alliance. Apart from
having state controlled media in both countries, Moscow and Beijing
worked together to bring their respective cultures to each other’s
population.[17] These initiatives, namely the 2006 Year of Russia in China,
followed by the Year of China in Russia,[18] predate Xi as the Chinese leader,
but the long-term effects are being seen in these more recent polling
results.

National Interests
Both Russia and China went through a significant amount of change in
the 20th century. Each saw revolutions with the final outcome being
communist leadership. As previously mentioned, both countries saw
devastating losses in World War II, an event that shapes national identity to
this day. For Russia’s part, the communist party fell in 1991, and the
country was plunged into turmoil with an ill-conceived privatization
process. China remains a communist country, though with a series of
reforms that combines market economics with Marxist principles, a system
named by reformer Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s “Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics.”[19] With such considerations, finding a cohesive national
identity, followed by clearly defined national interests can be somewhat
difficult.
Gilbert Rozman has sought to solve the puzzle in his work “The SinoRussian Challenge to the World Order.” The book is the third in a series in
which he outlines Chinese national identities vis-a-vis Japan, Korea, and
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finally Russia. He summarizes Russia’s interest, via what is often called the
“Millennium Manifesto” as resting “on the distinctiveness of its values,
rather than on its acceptance of universal values,”[20] a theme that Putin
and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have reinforced numerous
times. China, Rozman says, seeks a “great revival of the Chinese nation,” a
theme known as the “China Dream,” as popularized by Xi.[21]

The Russian Idea
On December 30, 1999, Putin published an essay entitled “Russia at
the Turn of the Millennium,” which thoroughly and explicitly outlined his
thoughts on Russian national interests.[22] In the opening remarks, he
notes, “First, Russia is not a state symbolizing top standards of economic
and social development now. And second, it is facing difficult economic and
social problems.” He continues with comparisons of per capita GDP and
global market share between Russia and the US. It is clear that his belief is
that the US at the time had set the benchmark for developed nations, and
that Russia should strive to be on equal footing. He makes a firm note that
neither “experimentation in Russian conditions with abstract models and
schemes taken from foreign textbooks,” nor, “[the] mechanical copying of
other nations' experience” can be successful. This is a theme he revisited
15 years later, speaking to the United Nations General Assembly, “Nations
shouldn’t be forced to all conform to the same development model that
somebody has declared the only appropriate one.”[23] He made his point by
directly criticizing previous Soviet experiences in the spread of
Communism, but it was also a thinly veiled message to the United States
that its experiments in promotion of democracy were failing.
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Even more recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov published
an article in March of 2016 entitled “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical
Background.” After outlining in great detail the cooperation and conflict
between Russia and the rest of Europe, he indicates a desire to uphold “the
rightful role of our country as a leading center of the modern world,” and
that Russia will provide “values of sustainable development, security and
stability.” He criticizes American Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history”
concept, where “rapid globalization signals the ultimate victory of the
liberal capitalist model, whereas all other models should adapt to it under
the guidance of the wise Western teachers,” by immediately debunking the
theory with the case of China, who “in just three decades” achieved toplevel economic status. He calls it an “axiomatic fact” that there are many
development models outside of the “monotony of existence within the
uniform, Western frame of reference.” China is also the only nation
explicitly named as he notes that BRICS and SCO partner states share the
approach that “long-term success can only be achieved on the basis of
movement to the partnership of civilizations based on respectful
interaction of diverse cultures and religions.”[24] Lavrov in his writing
indicates a consistency in general Russian foreign policy over time, but also
a consistency with the president. With the nods to China, he also reminds
readers that China is Russia’s top partner.

The China Dream
In one of his first public addresses as President of China, Xi Jinping
announced, “In my view, to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation
is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history.” His
speech was in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, a museum on Tian’anmen
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Square showcasing Chinese art, as well as an elaborate exhibit on China’s
modern history. It is telling that this exhibit, the Road to Rejuvenation,
begins with the Opium Wars and foreign occupation of China, a series of
humiliations at the hands of Western powers. With these events kept fresh
in the minds of the population, Xi’s platform simply states that China can
and will be prosperous, but only on its own terms, and on its own ideology
of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” His guidance to the people is
that “we have to continue taking this road, unswervingly,” however, to,
“keep in mind that to turn blueprints into realities takes a long time and it
also demands long and hard efforts.”[25]
The main interest of the Chinese Communist Party, the driving force
behind any initiative taken towards a great renewal, is economic growth, to
then fully transition from socialism to communism. With Marx, Lenin, Mao
and Deng all having paved the way for today’s China, Xi now turns to
economist Jeremy Rifkin, who proposes a “third industrial revolution
powered by both the Internet and renewable energy sources.”[26] Chinese
Prime Minister Li Keqiang has reportedly required top economic and
planning officials to read Rifkin, who himself has visited and advised
Chinese leadership. Speaking in China, Rifkin outlines China’s potential to
kick-start his third industrial revolution as being due in part to adherence to
socialism, as infrastructure is only created by governments and never
markets, and its resources:
China is ideally suited for the third industrial revolution because it has
the most ample reserves of renewable energy resources in the world. It has
the most solar radiance, most wind of any major country, off its coast.
China contains massive amounts of geothermal heat under the ground and
massive amounts of biomass from its rural, agricultural areas. China’s
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renewable energy resources can provide for every man, woman, and child
here until kingdom come.[27] With Rifkin providing the roadmap, Xi has a
clear direction in which to drive China forward.

Military and Security
There is much to be said of the unprecedented moves China and
Russia have made in the realm of security. Starting in 1998, Moscow and
Beijing adopted a direct presidential hot line, notably China’s first with
another government.[28] Joint training exercises, usually under the auspices
of the SCO, have also featured new forays in Chinese foreign policy. Peace
Mission 2007, for example, was the first overseas exercise for Chinese
airborne Units.[29]
The year 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of the allied victory in
World War II. For Russia and China, the war has held an especially
important role in their national histories, due to the casualties suffered at
the hands of their respective occupying forces. On May 9 in Moscow, and
September 3 in Beijing, large-scale military parades were held. Of import in
Moscow was the appearance not only of Xi Jinping, but the official debut of
the guard of honor of the three services of the PLA. This was also only the
fifth time that the PLA guard of honor had marched overseas.[30] Beijing
would host Putin as well as Russian troops, which formed the largest
contingent of foreign soldiers in the parade.
Putin and Xi each took the opportunity to discuss contemporary
international relations in their speeches at these parades. The focus, as
expected, was on multipolarity, or more exactly, against unipolarity and
hegemony. First, Putin remarked, “In the last decades, the basic principles
of international cooperation have come to be increasingly ignored,”
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principles, he continued, “that have been hard won by mankind as a result
of the ordeal of the war.” The President concluded with a thinly veiled
criticism of the US, describing “attempts to establish a unipolar world,”
and, “strong-arm bloc thinking,” underscoring the fact that this mentality
“undermines sustainable global development.”[31] In Beijing, Xi was less
direct in discussing how “[all] countries should jointly uphold the
international order and system underpinned by the purposes and principles
of the UN Charter,” and proposed to “build a new type of international
relations featuring win-win cooperation.” For China’s part, he said that
China “will remain committed to peaceful development,” and promised
“[no] matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek
hegemony or expansion. It will never inflict its past suffering on any other
nation.”[32]

Color Revolutions and External Influence
Russia and China have each experienced mass protests, either at home
or in their periphery, which leadership in both countries has indicated as
being orchestrated from without. Russia has seen so-called “color
revolutions” in the neighboring post-Soviet states of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
and twice in Ukraine. Lavrov, pinning blame on Western powers, described
the “technology of unconstitutional change of governments” as having
been “tried and tested,” as well as appearing to be “destructive for the
nations targeted by such actions.”[33] 2014 saw protests in Hong Kong,
which Chinese leadership accused American group the National
Endowment for Democracy of supporting as part of a “US strategy to
undermine foreign governments in the name of promoting democracy.”[34]
These movements only help to strengthen Russian and Chinese resolve to
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steer the world in the direction of multipolarity, with respect for national
sovereignty and distinct forms of governance and development, in contrast
to the singular rule imposed by the US.

Multipolarity and International Organizations
As previously stated, key components of Russian and Chinese national
interests revolve around state sovereignty and multipolarity in global rule.
It is with these ends in mind that both states have been proclaiming the
importance of international organizations, and Russia specifically seems to
seek a substitute for the widely accepted international anarchy with a more
“orderly type of relations,” in which multipolarity is a “structural condition
for greater coordination.”[35] Chinese leadership have made statements in
a similar regard, with Deng Xiaoping as early as 1984 noting that “to obtain
peace one must oppose hegemonism,”[36] and Jiang Zemin later outlining
tenets of China’s future goals as including “promoting multipolarity in the
international system.”[37] In fact, most Chinese statements regarding
foreign policy include some mention of these terms, as well as those like
cooperation and connectivity.
The primary organization on the planet is the United Nations, whose
charter guarantees national sovereignty and prevention from foreign
interference, something leadership in both states see as being overrun by
American exceptionalism.[38] Voting in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) between Russia and China has reflected a strong partnership since
the year 2000, whether it is voting in unison (six dual vetoes,) or abstaining
from votes altogether rather than voting against the other. In this regard,
of Russia’s five lone negative votes, China abstained all but once, in the
case of Cyprus in 2004, though it should be noted that in the ambassador’s
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remarks at the hearing, he expressed hope that the Council would have
“[carried] out further considerations and [considered] fully the views of all
parties with a view to achieving consensus,” echoing Russia’s primary
reasoning for voting no - the haste of the UNSC to move ahead of a Cyprian
referendum.[39] It is of greater concern that the more recent and high
profile Russian vetoes, namely those pertaining to Georgia and Ukraine,
were duly met with Chinese abstentions.[40]
Beyond the UN, Russia and China have created multilateral
organizations of their own. The BRICS group of emerging economies (an
acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has made moves,
in creating what is called the New Development Bank, to stand as an
alternative to the western dominated World Bank and IMF. In the realm of
security, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization facilitates military
cooperation and dialogue between states, including those that have
contentious relationships around the globe.

The BRICS Group and Abandoning the Dollar
Many moves have been taken on the part of both Russia and China to
reduce their reliance on the dollar or the euro as trade currencies. For
starters, the countries in 2014 agreed to a currency swap of $24.5 billion,
and Russia’s Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Moiseev has gone on record
to state that the goal is to have 50 percent of trade done in national
currencies. Alexander Gabuev writes, “For Moscow, this will help to lower
the risk of being overly exposed to the euro and the dollar. For Beijing, it
will be just another major step in promoting its currency before turning to
full convertibility.”[41] China is also working to open its Shanghai Stock
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Exchange to foreigners, and it has been hinted that Russian companies
could have some sort of preferred status on the market.[42]
Additionally, China is championing its New Silk Road project, also
known by the moniker One Belt One Road (OBOR,) invoking the pride of
China’s historical role in the Silk Road trade route between Europe and the
Far East. The most discussed function of OBOR is its economic component,
“literally a global project, and it belongs not to China, but to every country
that chooses to participate in it. China wants to promote world peace and
the sovereignty of states, and it intends to achieve this by integrating the
global economy into OBOR and vice versa.” Apart from economics, there
are three other purposes of the project, namely: security and diplomacy,
culture, and great power politics.[43]
Including local ownership simultaneously with economic integration
could, in a way, work in tandem with more overt security measures taken
by the OBOR project. Pepe Escobar, a former correspondent for AlJazeera,[44] writes, “If it succeeds even in part, it could take the gloss off alQaeda- and ISIS-style Wahhabi-influenced jihadism not only in China’s
Xinjiang Province, but also in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.
Imagine it as a new kind of Eurasian war on terror whose “weapons” would
be trade and development.”[45] This insinuation of peaceful gestures to
steer other nations away from extremism actually sits perfectly in line with
statements, detailed below, from Xi Jinping as pertains to China’s peaceful
development.
Russia for its part has developed what is known as the Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU), which created a free-trade zone with former Soviet
states, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Ukraine
was always seen as an obvious prospective member, however Ukrainian
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leader Viktor Yanukovich was also seeking free trade with the European
Union. Internal conflicts led to his ouster, and Ukraine never joined. At
first, it seemed that the two economic zones would be vying for position in
Central Asian states, however in 2015, they actually merged, creating a
“common economic space” in Eurasia.[46] This cooperation symbolizes a
priority of cooperation over all else, or as one Chinese expert of
international relations put it, “the keyword is connectivity.”[47]
Economic partnership continued to grow, when at the 2015 BRICS
summit in the Russian city of Ufa, the New Development Bank (NDB) was
announced. The official statement reads that, “Unlike the World Bank,
which assigns votes based on capital share, in the New Development Bank
each participant country will be assigned one vote, and none of the
countries will have veto power.”[48] The main purpose of the NDB is to
serve as “an institution that focuses on accelerating the pace towards the
transition to the ‘green economy’,”[49] which further cements China’s stated
goals in pursuing Rifkin’s third industrial revolution.

NDB Versus the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
One area for concern is that one year prior to the creation of the NDB,
China already created the $100 billion AIIB, which holds the largest share at
20%, with India and Russia holding lesser stakes.[50] What is the purpose of
two separate banking systems, and will the AIIB, which favors China to
Russia prove to be an unequal partnership? Chinese leadership has stated
that “the two will play a complementary role in funding infrastructure
development in Asia,”[51] while the NDB president, Kundapur Kamath, has
suggested that “the market is big enough for all of us.”[52] The explicit goals
of each bank vary as well, with AIIB focused directly on Asia, whereas NDB
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seeks to fund any developing nation,[53] and to fund exclusively green
initiatives, with the first scheduled funds totaling $811 million having been
approved in April of 2016 for renewable energy projects in the four of the
member countries of Brazil, India, South Africa and China.[54]

Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Diplomacy
The Central Asian republics are seen by both states as a “test case for
their aim to create a multipolar world order.”[55] Of primary importance in
this regard is the inclusion of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

A 2006

declaration from the SCO references what is known as the “Shanghai
Spirit,” which outlines “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation,
respect for multi-civilizations and pursuit of common development,” as
being the “underlying philosophy...of SCO.”[56]
Additionally important to the SCO are the three states of Iran, India
and Pakistan. Iran, having until 2015 been confined to observer status due
to United Nations sanctions for its alleged nuclear weapons program,[57] is
now ready to accede to full membership, a move welcomed by Xi Jinping in
a state visit to Tehran in early 2016.[58] This may fuel further accusations of
the SCO being anti-Western, since relations remain poor between Iran and
key Western allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia; however, it may indicate
that the SCO is ready to work with whomever, under the above-stated
principles of mutual benefit and equality, if not to simply snub the West on
the global stage.
Perhaps more striking is the new membership of both India and
Pakistan.[59] Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China in May of
2015, which included a visit to President Xi’s hometown of Xi’an, the first
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time the Chinese leader has ever hosted a foreign leader in this manner.[60]
Modi, for his part, made strong public statements in reference to
“harmonious partnership” between the two states as being “essential for
economic development and political stability,” and punctuated the trip
with a simple message on Twitter, “I strongly believe that this century
belongs to Asia.”[61] With this kind of rhetoric, one might forget that the
two countries still have multiple border disputes, which almost came to
armed conflict as recently as May 2013.[62] Through the belief in
partnership above all else, the states have shown a willingness to
cooperate, and not let these disputes dictate their relations.
Speaking on Russia, Modi describes the partnership as “truly
strategic,” stating that Russia is a “strong and reliable friend of India.”[63] It
is Russia’s relationship with Pakistan that begs questioning. Throughout
the cold war period, Pakistan was on the side of the US, particularly in the
Soviet-Afghan war. It was recently, when the US engaged in a covert
operation within Pakistani territory to kill Osama Bin Laden, combined with
publicly decrying alleged human rights abuses, a CIA operation killing two
Pakistanis, and the bombing of a military base in Pakistan, that the
narrative in Pakistan shifted away from the US. Media outlets proclaimed
“the end of American hegemony” being near, and that Pakistan should
move towards a “G-Zero world.”[64] Perfectly resonating with Russian
statements to similar effects, the two have begun working together in
multiple trade arenas.
The final point of concern with the simultaneous joining of India and
Pakistan is their rivalry with each other. The sale of military equipment, for
example, to Pakistan by Russia has been a cause for concern with Indian
leadership.[65] Chinese leadership have called on both states to uphold the
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“Shanghai Spirit,” where common development trumps all else, as well as
indicating the two states’ “important role in the SCO’s development,”
adding that their simultaneous accession will “play a constructive role in
pushing for the improvement of their bilateral relations.”[66] It is through
the use of the SCO, diplomacy, and the pursuit of partnership that Russia
and China have overcome differences with each other, India and Pakistan,
and have set a roadmap for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences
with each other. Lavrov reminds the world of when the US “ignored
international law by invading Iraq in 2003,” or when in 2011, the US
“distorted UN Security Council resolutions by overthrowing Muammar
Gaddafi’s regime by force in Libya”[67] as examples of the US putting
military might above all else, a tactic against which the SCO stands in
contrast.

Conclusion and Concerns
The two main powers of Eurasia, Russia and China, have taken great
pains to forge a new alliance that will be strong and enduring. President of
Russia Vladimir Putin has made special efforts with Xi Jinping, the leader in
Beijing, to accelerate and solidify the relationship. The two states have
embraced their common history and objectives and broken barriers in
trade and military cooperation. The growing power of international
organizations centered outside of Washington, such as the BRICS group and
the SCO, is providing other states who are disillusioned with American
hegemony the opportunities to grow economically and pursue their
individual development on their terms. Indeed, the guarantee of state
sovereignty is enshrined in the United Nations charter, but moving forward
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the defense of this principle will be headquartered further east, with
shared leadership among multiple parties.
Perhaps some of the biggest concerns for the future in this regard
include redefining current international relations theories and terminology.
First, as of right now the widely accepted system under which states exist
is actually no system at all, but anarchy. If the long-term vision of Russia
and China as outlined in this article were to come to fruition, would a
stronger United Nations emerge, and would the 193 member states, not
least of all Russia and China themselves, be ready to cede a certain level of
autonomy, under the premise of ensuring global peace and stability? At
the time of writing, it should be noted that the UK is scheduled to hold a
referendum on whether or not to stay in the EU,[68] which could set
precedence for other states to leave, or at least redefine the nature of the
Union’s control. This drive towards increased sovereignty, rather than
more organizational oversight would stand in stark contrast to Eurasian
ambitions to bolster the status of such institutions. Second, there is a case
to be made for a new type of hegemony emerging, namely in regards to
China as an economic powerhouse. As detailed above, China is investing
massive amounts of resources in infrastructure through the One Belt, One
Road project (importantly, increasing connectivity to and from China,) as
well as holding major power in two new alternatives to the IMF, there is a
distinct possibility of China exerting control in a more unilateral manner,
albeit of a financial nature rather than a military one.
The primary goal for Russia, then, is to ensure that China stays on the
path of embracing multipolarity and global governance. Moscow must also
continue to diversify Russia’s economy away from energy, as it found itself
being forced to do under western sanctions beginning in 2014, lest China
141

Beyond the Axis of Convenience: Re-examining Russian-Chinese Relations and the Search for
Multipolarity

use its role as a primary buyer in this sector as leverage. Dmitri Medvedev
has already announced that over 60% of total state revenues come from
non-energy sectors, noting that some of this change is related to low oil
prices, but also to indicate successful growth in other sectors, such as
agriculture, an overall reform that will “remain essential for us in the
coming years.”[69] Russia must also develop a stronger sense of continuity
in leadership. The importance of Eurasianism must extend beyond being
tied to Putin himself, and form the basis for Russian political identity, both
within the United Russia party and without. Truly, Russia need not look
farther than China itself, for as has been seen; the Chinese leadership
extending from Deng to Xi continuously embraces the ideas of harmony,
multipolarity, and connectivity. Should future Russian leadership move
away from China and seek to realign with Western powers, the Chinese
would have incentive to abandon an equal partnership, and continue largescale economic pursuits in the Eurasian region on their own terms. Thus,
while the “axis of convenience” may be disparaging in its original tone, it
might also be a misnomer in that continued partnership is not simply
convenient, but essential in ensuring the stated goals of multipolarity and
global equality.
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How the Tsetse Left Africa and Why the Rwandan Nightmare put the World to
Sleep
Savannah-Zhané Jolley, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract
In 1894, the exploration of Rwandan territory and its control begins; but by 1994,
no one seemed to care. The Rwandan genocide went under the radar, with crucial
world powers turning their heads away from the crisis. Key international leaders,
including the UN, claimed the genocide happened so quickly that it could not have
been prevented; we will test this claim by examining the history behind the
genocide, laying out the facts chronologically. In a span of 100 years—
colonization to genocide—we witness the state of Rwanda turn from a
harmonious civilization to a barbaric desert, in which tensions were often
documented by groups like the Human Rights Watch and served as early-warning
signs for the genocide to come. This paper will delve into the various aspects of
Rwandan history which created the ideology that sparked the gruesomely
pronounced destruction of an African nation.
In rural Africa, there is an insect known as the Tsetse—a large
bloodsucking fly that bites humans and other mammals. The Tsetse can transmit
African trypanosomiasis, more commonly known as “African sleeping sickness”;
a fatal disease if not treated properly (Centers for Disease Control, 2012). For all
intents and purposes, this paper is relating the actions of European explorers to
that of a Tsetse transmitting African sleeping sickness. This particular Tsetse
latched on to Rwanda and transmitted colonization, leaving the pathogens to
fester and the people to deal with the symptoms.
The 100 years of colonization led to the 100 days of a primitively
systematic genocide of five hundred thousand to one million Tutsi. Although
Rwanda is an established state, its genocide is often described as primitive
because of the rudimentary tools used (such as machetes, clubs, and hoes) hence
the nickname “the machete genocide.” It is interesting to question if these
rudimentary tools are truly what gained the genocide its nickname—was the
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genocide considered primitive in comparison to the high-tech weaponry used by
other groups like the Nazis or Serbs, or was the genocide considered primitive
simply due to the fact that it took place in Africa? This paper aims to trace the
symptoms of Rwandan history to see how the ideology that led to the genocide
was created: where did it come from, how did it get there, and what affect did it
have?

What Do You Mean, ‘What Do You Mean’?: The Understood Process of
Genocidal Ideologies
While there is no official ‘designed ideology’ for genocide, more often
than not, a main factor leading to its emergence is an ideological basis designed
against the victims. Ideologies often vary, yet specific concepts that support such
drastic measures remain constant and serve as a basis to the designated group
who will likely commit the crime.
Ideology is the collection of individual and societal conceptual arguments
that are the ideal ways of life for those who created them. Though there are many
forms of ideology, there are two primary forms that result in genocide: nationalist
ideologies revolving around power, wealth, influence, and frequently the purity
of a group/nation; and ‘better world’ ideologies offering ideal social arguments
for all of humanity, quite like communism (Charny, 1999b, p. 347). Numerous
ideologies specify particular enemies, which can result in genocidal tendencies as
well as societal destruction/catastrophe, as these specified enemies must be
“dealt with” in order to proceed with implementing the ideology. The ultimate
goal, however, is not always to kill. When the goal is not to kill, discrimination and
violence are used against the opponents, nonbelievers, and outsiders (Charny,
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1999b, p. 347). Nevertheless, this will eventually lead to genocide due to the
evolution of events:

Discrimination > Sporadic Violence > Genocide

Even though there are two primary sources of an ideology, it is possible for both
to be used together. This combination of nationalist and ‘better world’ ideologies
can be seen in Nazism through “lebensraum”—the belief by a state that it has the
natural right to claim more territory. In other words, a German desire for more
territory joined with a desire for the ideal race led to genocide. The concept of
these two ideological sources mixing together is also evident throughout the
Bosnian and Armenian genocides, as well as the “auto-genocide”, or the
extermination of a country’s citizens by its own government, in Cambodia.
What precisely tweaks an ideology and causes it to follow a more
destructive path? In these cases, intense social conditions and the frustration of
basic needs, mixed with fear and confusion, will easily do the trick. These
conditions are followed by the creation of a future that seems brighter than the
present; enter scapegoating. When current conditions are dreadful and a more
positive future seems possible, scapegoating becomes the rationale to explain
why the present is not as glorious as it is perceived it could be. People tend to feel
better about an undesirable present if they can understand why it is as such and
if they are able to see a brighter tomorrow with the source of their problem
eliminated. When scapegoating comes into play, the enemy tends to be the
group on the other side of a cultural/national rift. Due to a vicious frenzy of
dehumanization, antagonism, and propaganda, this image of the ‘enemy’ often
escalates quickly. Through various genocidal studies, we see that the increasing
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tension between those struggling and those blamed for the struggle ultimately
leads to the notion that the enemy must be killed, ironically, in order to avoid
complete destruction of society. The foundation of the ideology in the end
becomes, “they deserve to be and must be eliminated” (Charny, 1999b, p. 347).
Ultimately, it is psychologically easier to blame than it is to accept.

Same Difference: Rwanda’s Theoretical Fraternal Twins
In the lush grasslands of pre-colonial Rwanda, three groups of people
coexisted: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The harmonious living between these three
groups [in pre-colonized Rwanda] stemmed from the primary lack of difference
between the people. The three groups were not Rwanda’s individual clans, tribes,
or races. In order to be classified as such, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa would have
had to show separate interests from one another, which they did not. This society
can be described as “tribalism without a tribe” (Burns, 2014, p. 9).
Stories passed down through family generations tell us that Rwanda’s
Hutu and Tutsi stem from the same parents, or clans in this case, and share many
traits, but developed as two separate eggs. The members of either side can be
identified as individuals in the sense that despite having very similar internal
makeups, they have their own ‘physical’ traits that distinguish them from the
other group, as seen with fraternal twins. The only observable difference
between the two groups is related to castes determined by occupation, with Hutu
being agriculturists and Tutsi being herdsman.
The idea of Tutsi as herdsmen came from the arbitrary concept of
possessing at least ten cattle. A whole family was labeled Tutsi if the father owned
said cattle, or was otherwise labeled Hutu. This classification was not permanent
so long as the Hutu family acquired more cattle to achieve a Tutsi label; this
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concept began working in reverse with Tutsi trying to achieve a Hutu label once
the Hutu gained power (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 6). The Belgians, who believed there
is and should be a clear difference between the two groups, implemented this
labeling rule. Again, there was essentially no difference present between the two;
even the Belgians, who conducted experiments and applied theories for proof,
could not maintain an obvious divide. Unable to separate the groups from one
another, the Belgians introduced identity cards in the 1930’s which stated all of
the information needed to distinguish the two groups from one another. Belgians,
along with the Hutu and Tutsi themselves, would have to check these cards
continually for confirmation of individuals’ identities (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 6).

Swiping Right: The European Infatuation with Rwanda
In 1856, British explorer John Hanning Speke wrote journals analyzing the
civil dynamic between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. He focused his attention in areas
known today as Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda, making his first analysis of the
indigenous African people in a time and space separate from modern day
Rwanda. Speke justified his research with the biblical character of Ham and after
a few months was so enamored with his conclusion that he then wanted to share
it with the Tutsi African King Kamrasi of Unyoro. Speke expressed to the king that
his people come from white European descent, hence their tall slender build and
thinner noses; ultimately meaning they should reign supreme over their Black
counterparts in Africa. This introduction of racism and white supremacy to
Rwanda had laid the foundation for the genocide. Speke spoke with such
confidence of his findings that they became the perceived truth of the Rwandan
people by the explorers that followed.
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In the late 19th century, European explorers continued to search for
unclaimed African land. Rwanda’s second explorer, Count Von Gotzen of
Germany, arrived in 1894, two years after the first explorer Dr. Oscar Baumann
of Austria. Von Gotzen stressed that due to the Berlin Declaration of the Congo
Free State of 1885, which gave control of the bulk of The Congo and its people to
the King of Belgium (Leopold II), the Rwandan people had been living on German
land (Burns, 2014, p. 15). Von Gotzen’s intentions were not to explore, but to
make sure the inhabitants of the land knew of and accepted this declaration;
leading German forces against those who did not accept colonization, as he did
against the Tanzanians in the Maji Maji War. His work to force German ownership
over the Rwandans and their land made Von Gotzen responsible for the first
official step in Rwanda’s colonization by European powers.
The era of 1876-1914 was an intense and rapid hunt for territory,
becoming known as the Scramble of Africa. This era’s chaos only continued when
Belgium invaded Rwanda in 1916 and gained control after Germany lost its
overseas territories following World War I. Explorers had kicked off the
colonization process through the submission of previous inhabitants; now,
European influences could be implemented by separating the cohesive
civilization into a more suitable segregated society. Taking advantage of past
efforts, Belgium’s ultimate goal was to have an African trading partner for
Belgium’s economy and society to grow and benefit from. The racial divide
worked as intended as the Belgians continued the belief that the Tutsi were more
intellectual, beautiful, and all around more European than the Hutu—therefore
superior. Belgian administrator, Count Renaud de Briey, declared that the Tutsi
were actually descendants of the lost continent of Atlantis: “The [Tutsi] were
meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige
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vis-à-vis the inferior races which surround…It is not surprising that those good
[Hutu], less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting, have let
themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt” (Burns, 2014, p. 19).

If It Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck, Then It’s a Duck…Right?: The
Forced Identity of a Rwandan Elite
The colonization of Rwanda by Belgium was far more aggressively
executed than Rwanda saw by Germany. The Belgians, seeing Rwanda as a
necessary part of their government, focused on implementing Belgian standards
in order to essentially get Rwanda up to speed. Catholicism was named the
national religion, and French the national language. With African riches such as
gold, ivory, and diamonds being less plentiful in Rwanda than elsewhere on the
continent, the Belgians decided to “civilize” the people of Rwanda and introduce
them to Belgian society so they would have to pay taxes (Burns, 2014, p. 27). If
Belgium couldn’t get African riches, they would get rich from the Africans.
In order to prove the hypothesis of Tutsi superiority first posed by John
Hanning Speke correct, Belgium began conducting experiments and applying
Social Darwinism Theory in 1933 to prove that those with certain specified traits
were more likely to succeed. From this, such “evidence” was found which
“confirmed” the hypothesis: “Anatomy, consequently, shows [sic] how it comes
that individuals affected with dropsy of the brain may manifest all their
intellectual and affective faculties”, stated by Dr. Johann Gaspar Spurheim after
conducting many cranial comparisons of Hutu and Tutsi (Burns, 2014, p. 28). In
sum, it was believed that the size of one’s head was directly related to their
intelligence. Other studies took place contributing to the belief of Tutsi
superiority; comparisons of European and non-European humans concluded that
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the Tutsi were more similar to Europeans than the Hutu. The Twa were often
dismissed from experiments and theories because their population was so small;
the ultimate goal was not necessarily to decipher every individual’s race, but to
determine what made someone Tutsi.
The Belgians conducted fraudulent research solely to confirm what they
already believed, forcing evidence out of their experiments in order to support
their previous claims. They believed that the Tutsi should reign supreme, so they
manipulated the status quo to create a neatly packaged society which could be
added to their empire. Once the Tutsi were considered superior, it only seemed
fitting to place them in governmental jobs and leave the rest of the work for the
others. Having established Rwanda as “New Belgium”, the Tutsi were thrust into
national leadership due to the mentality of Belgium at the time: if you look like
us and [if we make you] act like us, then you are as such. After years of
brainwashing, the Tutsi believed so as well.

I’ll Take That: The Hutu Flip the Script
After a couple of decades of Tutsi ruling, nine Hutu, with help from
Belgian Flemish priests, banded together to change Rwandan political power in
1957. The Hutu Manifesto stated that if the cultural history of Rwanda was true,
and the Hutu were the original occupiers of the land which was invaded by the
Tutsi, then the Hutu are the rightful rulers of the land (Burns, 2014, p. 35).
November 1, 1959 is believed to have been the start of the violent tug-of-war
over political power after a Hutu political activist, named Dominique
Mbonyumutwa, was beaten to death by Tutsi political activists. This event
sparked rampant killings of Tutsis and the destruction of their homes.
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Multiple tugs of the rope never quite changed the majority of Rwandan
political rule, although there were slight advances here and there for both sides.
The Belgians saw, however, the progress Hutus had made in changing the system;
they switched their allegiance and began an assisted election more favored to
Hutus.
Rwanda officially was under a Hutu political majority after receiving its
independence in 1961. Belgium left as suddenly and chaotically as it came in. The
umpire’s exit from the match prompted the tables to turn, the rules to twist, and
the teams to play dirty. The result of the election was a powerful backlash on the
part of the Hutu against the Tutsi. The Tutsi had been yanked off their pedestal
and the Hutu, who had been oppressed for years, now had the power.
For the purpose of this paper, we will not go back and forth between
slight political gains and losses of the Hutu and Tutsi for the following 30 years
from the Hutu election victory to the genocide, because by that point, the
damage had already been done; time had allowed ideas to fester in the minds of
the Rwandans, eventually becoming ideologies. Having discussed the background
information regarding where beliefs came from, why they were implemented,
and how they began to twist Rwanda on a national level, we will now look into
how all the nation’s people got tied into the genocide.

“It’s Alive!”: The Further Growth of the Rwandan Majority
From July 1993 to July 1994, the Hutu majority in Rwanda relied on radio
broadcasting to proselytize their vision of an ideal society. Radio-Télévision Libre
des Mille Collines (RTLMC), mainly broadcasted in the native language of
Kinyarwanda, was a broadcast network which revolutionized Rwandan
broadcasting, largely being known for its rowdy nature and street language.
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Similar to radio broadcasting in western nations, RTLMC relied on the use of DJs
who played pop music and held phone-ins. There is a difference, however,
between the broadcasting known in Western nations and that of 1993 Rwanda.
At times, announcers would broadcast while inebriated, causing their jokes to
become vulgar, offensive and crude. Although, this seemingly disastrous stunt
actually helped the station appeal to its niche audiences. Due to its lack of factual
material, RTLMC depended on the use of running commentaries and lengthy
interviews as entertainment. This led to continued interest from listeners as it
was different from more formal radio stations like Radio Rwanda. Ironically,
according to its documents of incorporation, RTLMC was designed to “‘create
harmonious development in Rwandese society’, contribute to the education of
people and transmit true, objective information” (Melvern, 2000, p. 71).
Who is behind this ingenious one of a kind radio station, you may ask?
This is threefold—creative, political, and financial. Creatively speaking, Ferdinand
Nahimana worked as the brains of the operation, while Radio Rwanda's Joseph
Serugendu provided technical support. As a historian and a propagandist—quite
contradictory—Nahimana inspired the style of RTLMC to integrate planned news
bulletins that would instill fear and incite murder (Melvern, 2000, p. 70).
Politically, there was the Rwandan government. Studios for RTLMC were
connected to generators of the presidential palace and programs were played to
the entire country via transmitters owned and operated by the government’s
Radio Rwanda. Financially, there were Hutu extremist shareholders. For 5,000
Rwandan francs each there was a total of 20,000 shares, but no one could own
more than 1,000. The list of shareholders, some twenty-five pages in length,
contained names of people in various professions from businessmen to
journalists and bank managers to government officials; most notably listed was
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the president of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, owning the largest amount of
shares. Félicien Kabuga, the president of RTLMC’s board of directors, was an
industrialist and financial advisor to President Habyarimana, who graciously
helped fund the Interahamwe and Kangura, a Hutu paramilitary organization and
a weekly newspaper that supplied anti-Tutsi propaganda supported by influential
military and government officials, respectively. Kangura published mandates with
potentially fatal consequences: ‘Let us learn about the [Tusti] plans and let us
exterminate every last one of them’. Kangura essentially released the Hutu Ten
Commandments with instructions to mistreat and discriminate against Tusti
(Melvern, 2000, p. 72).
As a fantastic weapon for propaganda by use of commentary, pop music
and phone-ins, a strategically unique approach to broadcasting ultimately
camouflaged itself to suck people in; RTLMC prepared Rwandans for genocide.

Please Sir, May I have Some More: A Renewed Interest In Rwanda
Trying to persuade diplomats in Kigali to take RTLMC seriously was
practically impossible. Due to the West’s influence and a consequent belief in
freedom of speech, they saw RTLMC as being open to various interpretations.
This is not to say that those who were against RTLMC did not believe in freedom
of speech, but that ultimately the station took it too far. It is relatively safe to say
that a deliberate witch-hunt should not get to curl up under the cozy blanket of
free speech. Such a hunt incited fear into society in just the way Nahimana
intended:
I listened to RTLMC because if you were mentioned over the [radio],
you were sure to be carted off a short time later by the
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Interahamwe. You knew you had to change your address at once
(Melvern, 2000, p. 71)
Not all officials, however, conveniently ignored the public threats from
RTLMC. Johan Swinnen, the Belgian ambassador in Kigali, warned Brussels of the
destabilization being caused by the radio station. It is agreed by many that not
enough was done to nullify the broadcasts, even considering those who bothered
to look at the national destabilization. Lieutenant Mark Nees, a Belgian military
intelligence officer, believes that if the broadcasts had been managed the
genocide may have never taken place. Surely there is no way to know this for
sure, but it seems to be an appropriate hypothesis as the RTLMC’s national access
and its high levels of favorability assisted in the ideological communication of the
nation: ‘Stand up, take action…without worrying about international opinion’
(Melvern, 2000, p. 72).
The insanity of RTLMC in 1993 sparked the return of international interest
in Rwandan affairs. Whether you were for or against RTLMC, it seemed that the
genocide could not have been prevented because of the speed in which things
escalated—seeing as this radio controversy took place in the year leading up to
the genocide. RTLMC, however, was not the start of rising tensions. The
international community marked RTLMC as the catalyst to the genocide when in
actuality it was the last straw. When looking at the history behind the genocide it
is clear to see not only the effect colonization had to erode the Rwandan
civilization, but also the effect of the continual abandonment from world powers.
Years later, these same world powers claimed that tensions rose so quickly that
the genocide could not have been prevented; we have discussed 100 years of
Rwandan history to showcase this claim as fraudulent. The purpose of this paper
is to highlight the impact foreign powers had—with their arrival to and departure
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from Rwanda—in creating the ideology that then lead to the genocide. This paper
aims to take the blame off of the Rwandan people for their apparent selfdestruction, and place it on that of the Europeans, whose colonization was the
beginning of Rwanda’s slow collapse. After all, you wouldn’t blame the victim for
getting bit by the Tsetse, would you?

The Chicken or the Egg: The Wrap Up
From initial contact to long after the Tsetse had left to find its next meal,
Rwanda showed symptoms from the bite and, with no medical staff to prevent
conditions from worsening, fell victim to the disease. It is just as important to
understand the key historical moments that create an ideology, as it is to
understand how an ideology itself leads to genocide. The difference in the
Rwandan tale of genocide versus others around the globe is its lack of treatment.
There were multiple periods in which international powers could have stepped in
to settle things down and attempt to cure the disease. It may be easily defendable
as to why they did not step in as expected; perhaps they didn’t see their
responsibility in the case, or simply just did not want to intervene out of pure selfinterest. So, which came first: international negligence or Rwandan chaos?
In this paper, we discussed key periods throughout Rwandan history that
would have led to such a destructive ideology; therefore the argument stands
that it was in fact international negligence that proceeded Rwandan chaos and if
certain events which created destabilizing tensions had not taken place, the
genocide may not have occurred.
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Review of “As Others See Us: The
Causes & Consequences of Foreign
Perceptions of America” by Stephen
Brooks

three “I’s” of “cognitive ignorance”
(ignorance,
insularity,
and
indifference) that Americans are
perceived to fall into by foreign
countries, and by analyzing value
gaps between the United States and
foreign states. The values taken into
consideration
include:
religion,
moral absolutism, civic-mindedness,
individualism, and patriotism. Based
off Brooks’ argument, all of these are
critical players in the overwhelming
Anti-American perceptions that he
gathers in this study. He mentions
that some governments regularly
manipulate their respective state’s
media, which their citizens actively
digest, in a way that makes the
United States appear villainous.
While the analysis is validated
through Brooks’ consolidation of
studies from various political
scientists including their case studies
on a few key countries including but
not limited to England, German, and
France, there’s a glaring issue within
his analysis and his method in
unfolding the information that he
has gathered. Certain countries,
primarily Canada and prominent
members of the European Union, are
used to defend Brooks’ argument
that most of the world has an AntiAmerican sentiment towards the
United States; however, he seldom
brings up any counter argument
using American-favoring countries
such as the Philippines. In fact, the
only time Brooks mentions any
countries outside of his stock five-toseven case study countries is when
he aims to emphasize his point and
further sway the reader that AntiAmericanism is an ideology the rules
the planet outside of our borders.

Mikaela Turkan Reinard, Virginia
Commonwealth University
“As Others See Us: The Causes &
Consequences
of
Foreign
Perceptions of America” by Stephen
Brooks is an analytical study
depicting how the world views
America: our policies, our people,
and our presence in the world. This
analysis published in 2006, while
thorough isn’t satisfying for the
political world of 2017. With the
United States being such a dominant
actor in the global political arena, it’s
important to understand how other
countries view our diplomacy and
intervening actions. The way foreign
countries perceive what the United
States government does gives us an
idea of how they will interact with us
in a diplomatic sense.
In 159 pages, Brooks reveals
to the reader that not many
perceptions of America are positive.
In fact, positive perceptions are few
and far between and are seldom
discussed in the book. According to
Brooks, perceptions of the United
States in foreign locations are
solidified in their negative light due
to interventionism outside of our
borders (i.e. Iraq War), the hyperglobalization of American culture,
and constituents of other countries
feeling as though there’s an inability
for other countries to have a say in
international political matters. These
various categories of perception are
analyzed through understanding the
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The name of the book and
its opening pages gave a false
perception of what the analysis
would actually focus on. Brooks’ idea
that the vast majority of the world
preaches
Anti-Americanism
is
supported by the viewpoints of a
handful of countries in his study.
Ultimately, in order for this study to
be completely valid, it needs to be
expanded and take more countries
into consideration---at least one
country from every major region on
Earth (The Middle East, North Africa,
sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia,
etc.)
Brooks’ argument has the
opportunity to be exponentially
strengthened by including more case
studies that survey more countries.
Doing this would offer a far more
coherent idea of the world’s
perception of the United States,
which is what this book aims to do.
Essentially, Canadians will have a
different viewpoint opposed to
someone from Yemen, but the way

Brooks’ analysis is currently set up
gives the impression that foreign
perception of the United States is
monotonous and doesn’t alter based
on geographical location. In addition,
the argument altogether needs to be
updated to accommodate the ease
of information gathering due to the
influx of technology. Much of how
people view the world has changed
in the last 11 years with the
normalization of social media and
heightened access to the Internet in
many parts of the world. Even those
who do not have readily access to
these luxury items still have easier
access to Internet cafes than they
did 11 years ago. Information from
all around the world is far easier to
disseminate. Those who might have
had little to no opinion on American
domestic and foreign policies in
2006 may now be fully aware of all
that is happening within our borders
in 2017 due to this and that directly
affects perceptions that foreigners
have regarding the United States.
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other identifying information from your paper and:
Step 1: Email your submission to:
VCUPoliSciReview@gmail.com
Step 2: Fill out the submission form:
https://goo.gl/forms/thqhzEeWx2u50TNg2
Include an abstract (100-250 words) and works cited page.
Please direct all questions to Dr. Reckendorf:
anreckendorf@vcu.edu

169

Virginia Commonwealth University
Department of Political Science
Founders Hall
827 West Franklin Street
Richmond, VA 23284
804-827-2076
polistaff@vcu.edu

